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MORAL EVILS V. HEALTH AND SAFETY 
EVILS: THE CASE OF AN OVUM 
“OBTAINED” FROM A “DONOR” AND 
USED BY THE “DONOR” IN HER OWN 
SURROGATE PREGNANCY 
 
Pamela M. White* 
   
This paper critically examines the amendment made in 
2012 to section 10(2)(c) of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, 2004 mandating the screening and 
testing of “obtained” ovum “donated” by a “donor” and 
                                                 
*  Dr Pamela M White holds an LLM (Medical Law and Ethics) from 
Kent Law School, University of Kent and a PhD from McGill 
University. For over twenty-five years Dr White worked at Statistics 
Canada as senior Director in the divisions of Demography, Health Data 
Analysis, and Data Access and Security where she managed research 
programs, member of the editorial board for journal Health Reports, 
and undertook social, health, and family data analysis. During this 
time, she took assignments with the Office of the Federal Privacy 
Commissioner and Assisted Human Reproduction Canada. Since 
2013, Dr White has been a Specialist Associate Lecturer, Kent Law 
School, University of Kent where she teaches undergraduate and LLM 
degree courses in medical law and ethics and privacy and data 
protection law. At Canterbury Christchurch University, she teaches 
Medical Law to law students and Health Law and Ethics to those 
enrolled in the Health Science program. She has published extensively 
on Canada’s misplaced and misguided Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act. Her work melds qualitative and quantitative data analysis with 
critical legal studies to investigate gendered harms and liminal legal 
spaces. Her publications focussing on surrogacy highlight Canada’s 
lack of empirical data on the practice and its outcomes. Attempts to 
locate information reveals that Canada is an emerging hub for 
international surrogacy.   
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used in her own surrogate pregnancy. The amendment at 
section 10(1) of the Act cites the federal government’s 
obligation to reduce harm to human health and safety 
arising from use of sperm or ova for human reproduction, 
including the risk of disease transmission. This paper 
argues that the amendment mandating the screening and 
testing of surrogate ova when used by the surrogate in her 
own surrogate pregnancy creates a dangerous liminal 
regulatory space; one that transforms the surrogate into a 
third-party donor yet she incurs no health and safety risk 
to herself as she is the recipient of her own ova embryo. 
Genetic implications for the surrogate-born child makes a 
stronger case in support of mandatory testing, however the 
amendment imposes no similar screening and testing 
regime on the usual category of traditional surrogates: 
women who bear genetically-related children conceived 
through artificial insemination (IUI) rather than IVF. The 
paper questions the application of a health and safety evil 
that the amendment seeks to address. It suggests the real 
evil is a moral one whereby criminal code sanctions are 
being employed to discourage traditional surrogacy when 
practiced as a result of assisted reproduction techniques.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the many criticisms levelled at Canada’s Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, 2004 has been its lack of 
regulatory certainty. By early 2018, only one set of 
regulations, the Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, had been 
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passed.1 Ethicists,2 lawyers3 and clinicians4 have 
repeatedly called on the federal government to take 
legislative action to update Canada’s 1998 human sperm 
screening and testing regulation,5 address the lack of health 
protections for patients using donated ova,6 and bring 
clarity to the law regarding reimbursement of gamete 
donors and surrogates.7  
                                                 
1  SOR/2007-137, s 8 [Section 8 (Consent) Regulations]. 
2  Françoise Baylis, Jocelyne Downie & David Snow, “Fake it Till You 
Make it: Policy Making and Assisted Human Reproduction in Canada” 
(2015) 36:6 J Obstetricians & Gynecologists Can 510: 512; Jocelyne 
Downie & Francoise Baylis, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs: 
Law, Policy, and (In)action in Canada” (2013) 41:1 JL Med & Ethics 
224 at 239; Alana Cattapan, “Rhetoric and reality: Protecting Women 
in Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction” (2013) 
25:2 CJWL 202. 
3  Erin Nelson, Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013) at 326–34. 
4  Kelly Crowe “Test Imported Human Eggs, Doctors Urge”, CBC News 
(29 April 2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/health/test-imported-
human-eggs-doctors-urge-1.1207174>. 
5  Stu Marvel, “'Tony Danza is My Sperm Donor?': Queer Kinship and 
the Impact of Canadian Regulations around Sperm Donation” (2013) 
25:2 CJWL 221 at 221. 
6  Vanessa Gruben, “Women as Patients, Not as Spare Parts: Examining 
the Relationship Between the Physician and Women Egg Providers” 
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 249 at 249–50. 
7  Alison Motluk “The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s Fertility Laws 
Are Failing Donors, Doctors, and Parents”, The Walrus (April 2010), 
online: <thewalrus.ca/category/issues/2010-04/>; Alison Motluk, 
“First Prosecution under Assisted Human Reproduction Act Ends in 
Conviction” (2014) 186:2 CMAJ E75; R v Picard and Canadian 
Fertility Consulting Ltd, (2013) unreported, available online at: 
<cdn.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/sites/noveltechethics/AHRA_
Facts.pdf>.  
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The tide, however, appears to be turning. On 
September 30, 2016, Health Canada announced its 
intention to affirm and clarify several regulations listed in 
the Assisted Human Reproductive Act 2004 (AHRA). 8 It 
plans to revise the 1996 Semen Regulations and move them 
from the Food and Drugs Act to the AHRA (2012); develop 
regulations for the screening and testing of ova donors; 
establish gamete tracing protocols; clarify reimbursable 
expenses for parties involved in surrogacy arrangements 
and sperm and ova donation; and institute inspection 
procedures.9  
 
Since the 2016 announcement, Health Canada has 
engaged in web-based consultations and invited 
stakeholders and interested parties to comment on its 
proposed pathways for regulatory change. Consultation has 
occurred alongside the Standards Council of Canada’s re-
development and re-release in late 2017 of a revised 
National Standard of Canada, CAN/CSA-Z900.2.1.-17 
Tissues For Assisted Reproduction.10 This updated 
                                                 
8  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
9  SOR/96-254 [Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted 
Conception Regulations]; Health Canada, News Release, 
“Government of Canada plans to introduce regulations to support the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (30 September 2016), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2016/09/government-
canada-plans-introduce-regulations-support-assisted-human-
reproduction-act.html>; Canada Gazette, Government Notice, 150:40, 
“Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (1 October 2016), online: 
<www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-10-01/html/notice-avis-
eng.html#ne1>. 
10  Standards Council of Canada, CAN/CSA-Z900-17 Tissues for Assisted 
Reproduction, Ottawa: SCC, 2017 at 8 [2017 Can/CSA].  
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Standard is a propriety set of guidelines, though it should 
be noted that its development, like that of its predecessors, 
was funded by Health Canada.11 It has been expected that 
the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard would shape the screening, 
testing, labelling, packaging, and reimbursement 
regulations likely to be tabled in the 2018-19 Parliamentary 
Session.12  
 
In early February 2018, Health Canada released a 
short overview report entitled: “What We Heard”.13 It 
summarized the “57 sets of comments” received during the 
2016–17 consultation period but did not reveal the 
direction that the government was likely to take in response 
to identified concerns.14 Nor did it suggest how conflicting 
                                                 
11  Ibid. In January 2018, the cost for the standard was $165.00 plus HST. 
This cost provides the purchaser with an independent licence to access 
the Standard. The purchaser is also entitled to obtain updates. 
12  Ibid. It should be noted that the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard also includes 
an itemization of the legitimate expenses for which gamete donors and 
surrogates should receive reimbursement; Health Canada, Draft 
Directive: Health Canada, Directive: Technical Requirements for 
Therapeutic Donor Insemination, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018, 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-
assisted-human-reproduction-regulations/technical-directive.html#c>, 
will be incorporated by reference; See:  Mark C McCleod, 
“Reimbursement of Expenditures and Possible Sub-delegation of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Regulations” in Surrogacy in Canada: 
Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) 
for an explanation of how incorporation by reference will be 
accomplished.  
13  Health Canada, What We Heard Report: A Summary of Feedback from 
the Consultation: Toward a Strengthened Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (12 January 2018) [Health Canada, What We Heard]. 
14  Ibid at 1. 
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views might be addressed.15 On September 27, 2018, 
Health Canada published in the Canada Gazette the long 
awaited draft Assisted Reproduction Act Regulations 
regarding Administration and Enforcement of the Act; 
Reimbursement of Expenditures under subsection 12(1) of 
the Act; Regulations Amending the Assisted Human 
Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations; Safety of 
Sperm and Ova Regulations and Draft Health Canada 
Directive: Technical Requirements for Conducting the 
Suitability Assessment of Sperm and Ova Donors.16  
Though not the explicit topic of this paper, the 2018 
proposed Regulations and Draft Directive differ in 
important ways from the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard.17 
These differences along with non-acceptance of proposals 
for the reimbursement of gamete donors and surrogates for 
example submitted during the initial phase of the 
regulatory consultation can no doubt be expected to be 
                                                 
15  Ibid. 
16  Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Safety of Sperm and 
Ova Regulations” at 3637–734; Canada Gazette, Proposed 
Regulations, 152:43, “Reimbursement Related to Assisted Human 
Reproduction Regulations” at 3735–40; Canada Gazette, Proposed 
Regulations, 152:43, “Regulations on the Administration and 
Enforcement of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act” at 3741–44; 
Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Regulations 
Amending the Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) 
Regulations” at 3745–51, online: <www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-
pr/p1/2018/2018-10-27/html/index-eng.html>;  Health Canada, Draft 
Directive: Technical Requirements for Conducting the Suitability 
Assessment of Sperm and Ova Donors, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018, 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-
assisted-human-reproduction-regulations/technical-directive.html#c>. 
17  Compare, for example, the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard for 
Reimbursement of Sperm and Ova donors and surrogates and the 2018 
Proposed Regs. 
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raised during the second phase of consultations scheduled 
for late 2018 and early 2019.18  
 
While such initiatives indicate that the federal 
government has finally decided to take-action to resolve 
some of the longstanding AHRA regulatory inadequacies, 
the approach falls short of the extensive legislative renewal 
advocated for by those seeking changes to the sections that 
ban commercial surrogacy and gamete donation and limit 
research.19 Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the 
legal and policy implications of the amendments made to 
the AHRA in 2012.20  
 
This paper critically examines section 10 of the 
2012 AHRA amendment and Health Canada’s proposed 
regulatory response. In particular, the paper focusses on the 
amendment made to section 10(2)(c) of the AHRA 
mandating the screening and testing of “obtained” ovum 
“donated” by a “donor” and used in her own surrogate 
                                                 
18  Health Canada, Consultation on Proposed Assisted Human 
Reproduction Regulations, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018, online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-assisted-
human-reproduction-regulations.html>. 
19  Canadian Fertility & Andrology Society, “CFAS Position Statement: 
Compensation for Third Party Reproduction in Canada” (May 2017) 
and update provided May 2018, online: <www.cfas.ca/public-
affairs/position-statements/>; Alison Motluk, “Fertility Advocates 
Protest Criminal Sanctions in Assisted Reproduction Act” (2018) 190:2 
CMAJ E58–E59. 
20  Alana Cattapan & Sara Cohen, “The Devil We Know: The 
Implications of Bill C-38 for Assisted Human Reproduction in 
Canada” (2013) 35:7 J Obstet Gynaecol Can 654 at 654–56. 
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pregnancy.21 The stated rationale for the amendment at 
section 10 cites the federal government’s obligation to 
reduce harm to human health and safety arising from use 
of sperm or ova for human reproduction, including the risk 
of disease transmission.22 Indeed, one of the stated 
objectives of the 2016 Health Canada legislative renewal 
initiative acknowledges the need to “reduce the risk to 
human health and safety from using donor sperm and eggs 
(ova), including the risk of transmitting disease.”23 This 
paper argues that the amendment mandating the screening 
and testing of surrogate ova when used by the surrogate in 
her own surrogate pregnancy creates a dangerous liminal 
regulatory space; one that transforms the surrogate into a 
third-party donor yet she incurs no health and safety risk to 
herself as she is the recipient of her own ova embryo. 
Moreover, the amendment imposes a screening and testing 
regime that is not mandated for the usual category of 
traditional surrogates: women who bear genetically-related 
children conceived through artificial insemination (IUI) 
rather than IVF. 
 
In advancing this argument, the paper identifies 
three issues raised by the 2012 AHRA amendment and 2018 
proposed Regulations targeting traditional surrogacy when 
carried out as a result of IVF assisted reproduction 
                                                 
21  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c-19, s 714 
[Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act]. 
22  Ibid, section 10(1) as amended by Jobs, Growth and Long-term 
Prosperity Act; AHRA supra note 8. 
23  Health Canada, Public Consultation, “Strengthening the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act” (26 January 2018), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-assisted-
human-reproduction.html>. 
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technologies.24 The first issue is that failure to screen and 
test a woman’s obtained ovum used in her own surrogate 
pregnancy carries criminal penalties. The Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) decision in Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (Ref re AHRA) permits the federal 
government to legislate in areas where a “health evil” is 
present.25  The paper investigates the assumed “health evil” 
that requires the application of federal criminal law powers 
to mandate screening and testing of an “obtained” ovum 
“donated” by a woman and used in her own surrogate 
pregnancy.26 It asks the following question: Can we be 
satisfied that the amendment meets the harm test for 
application of criminal law powers established by the SCC 
in Ref re AHRA?27 It looks to the proposed 2018 regulations 
for guidance regarding the screening and testing regime to 
be mandated for this unique type of “donated” ova.  
   
The second issue concerns the term “donor”. 
Terminological confusion created by the AHRA is 
compounded by the use of a different definition of donor 
                                                 
24  Traditional surrogates are genetically related to the child if they agree 
to carry for intended parent(s). They supply their own ova used in their 
surrogate pregnancy. Most traditional surrogacy occurs as a result of 
assisted insemination. The amendment is directed at IVF treatments 
whereby the surrogate’s ovum (ova) are obtained as a result of ovarian 
stimulation. The ex utero ovum would then be fertilized using sperm 
from the intended parent or by sperm obtained for the reproductive use 
of the intended parent(s). 
25  Ubaka Ogbogu, “The Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference 
and the Thin Line Between Health and Crime” (2013) 22:1 Const 
Forum Const 93 at 93–97. 
26  AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(2)(c). 
27  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 
3 SCR 457 at paras 13–14 [Ref Re AHRA]. 
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by the 2017 Canadian Standards Association Standard, 
provincial statutes, Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society treatment guidance documents, and 2018 proposed 
Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations. The paper argues 
that confusion over the term “donor” contributes to a 
misunderstanding regarding the health and safety risks 
encountered by a woman using her own “obtained” ova in 
her own surrogate pregnancy. The paper critically explores 
the implications of this confusion for reproductive law and 
policy.  
 
The third issue raised by the amendment centres on 
the legal transformation of a traditional surrogate who 
undergoes ovarian stimulation and IVF reproductive 
treatments. The paper argues that the transformation occurs 
in part due to confusion over the word “donor” alongside 
the multi-faceted fertility treatment roles taken on by a 
traditional surrogate which result in her being both an “egg 
donor” and a “surrogate”. The paper asserts that law and 
practice transform her into a legal liminal figure. Her 
status, as Turner who expounded on the concept of 
liminality explained, becomes being in “betwixt and 
between positions assigned and arranged by law, custom, 
convention and ceremony.”28 It is this in-between status 
that presents confusion about health and safety risks, 
compromises her autonomy to make decisions about the 
use of her “obtained” ova and her treatment as a fertility 
                                                 
28  Victor Witter Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 
(Lewis and Henry Morgan Lectures), (New York: Aldine Transaction, 
1969) at 95.   
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patient, and leads to her being viewed as a “spare part”29 
provider and as a “treatment option” for infertile patients 
and intended parent(s).30  
 
To analyse these three substantive issues, the first 
section of this paper will review Canada’s assisted 
reproduction legal landscape. It examines the AHRA 
definition of “donor” and considers how the AHRA 
definition differs from the terminology used in in 
provincial statutes, the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard, CFAS 
reproductive treatment guidelines, and the 2018 proposed 
AHRA regulations. The paper also chronicles the 
amendments made to the AHRA in 2012 that require 
screening and testing of human reproductive tissue used in 
fertility treatments and explore a number of implications of 
the amendment in regard to consent, reproductive 
autonomy, and health risks.  
 
Having established the legislative parameters of the 
AHRA amendments, the second section of the paper 
analyses the health and safety harms that could be viewed 
as conditions sufficient to require the imposition of 
criminal law sanctions if untested and unscreened 
“obtained” traditional surrogate ova are used in the 
traditional surrogate’s pregnancy. I seek to establish 
                                                 
29  Vanessa Gruben, “Assisted Reproduction Without Assisting Over-
Collection: Fair Information Practices and the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Agency of Canada” (2009) 17 Health LJ 225 at 229. 
30  Pamela M White, “‘Why We Don’t Know What We Don’t Know’ 
About Canada’s Surrogacy Practices and Outcomes” in Surrogacy in 
Canada: Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy, Vanessa Gruben, 
Alana Cattapan & Angela Cameron eds (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) 51 
at 72–73 [White, “Why We Don’t Know”]. 
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whether the health and safety harms would be to the 
traditional surrogate herself, the clinic, other fertility 
patients, surrogate-born child, or to society more broadly. 
The paper will examine if the identified health and safety 
harms meet the criminal law test set out by the SCC in Ref 
re AHRA. It is worth recalling that in Ref re AHRA, Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps took the view that not all public 
health risks should be addressed through criminal law in 
declaring that “. . . it must be found that there is an evil to 
be suppressed or prevented. . . .”31  
 
The final section of the paper analyses several 
problems identified with the amendment, including 
whether a sufficient health and safety justification exists to 
impose criminal code penalties in cases where unscreened 
and untested “obtained” ova “donated” by a traditional 
surrogate are used in her own surrogate pregnancy. This 
section examines whether the proposed regulatory actions 
function as a thinly disguised attempt to discourage the 
practice of traditional surrogacy when undertaken using 
IVF. The paper posits that the legislated screening and 
testing requirements render traditional surrogates a special 
group of reproductive patients. It places them in a 
dangerous liminal legal reproductive space that potentially 
exposes them to risky practices.  
 
To conclude, the paper highlights a number of 
regulatory problems that are created as a result of the 
inconsistent application of the term “donor”, legislative 
change to AHRA section 10 and the proposed 2018 
Regulations on Safety of Sperm and Ova. These legislative 
instruments have reframed the boundaries of health and 
                                                 
31  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 243.  
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safety harms to create dangerous liminal legal regulatory 
spaces.32 It concludes that the amendments at subsection 
10(2)(c) further reveal the problems of Canada’s 
misshapen and misplaced AHRA.   
 
BRIEF HISTORY OF ASSISTED HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION ACT, 2004 
 
Canada’s AHRA 2004 passed after nearly twenty years of 
extensive consultation, in-depth study and, at times, 
acrimonious debate.33 It is considered by many legal and 
policy scholars to be seriously flawed.34 The Act had 
freshly achieved Royal Assent when Quebec contested the 
use of federal criminal law powers to regulate the practice 
                                                 
32  Graeme Laurie, “Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research 
Legislation: What are We Missing in the Spaces in-Between?” (2017) 
25:1 Med L Rev 47 at 48–49. 
33  Ottawa, Privy Council Office, Proceed with Care - Final Report of the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993) (Chair: 
Patricia Baird); House of Commons, Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Building Families (December 2001). The Baird report was 
voluminous. List of research studies and researchers can be found in 
the Appendix. This was a Parliamentary Committee Report. See also 
Monique Hébert, Nancy M Chenier, & Sonia Norris, Legislative 
History of Bill C-13, (10 October 2002), Library of Parliament.   
34  Pamela M White, “‘A Less than Perfect Law’: The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Canada’s Assisted Human   Reproduction Act” in Kristy Horsey, ed, 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulation Revisited, (London: 
Routledge, 2015) 170; François Baylis and Jocelyne Downie, “A Tale 
of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada: A Tragedy in Five Acts” 
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 183 [Baylis & Downie “A Tale of Assisted Human 
Reproduction”]; Alana Cattapan “Rhetoric and Reality: ‘Protecting’ 
Women in Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction” 
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 202. 
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of fertility medicine.35 In 2010, the SCC agreed with 
Quebec’s position in Ref re AHRA and rendered the 
sections of the Act legislating in areas under provincial 
constitutional jurisdiction ultra vires, most notably the 
practice of medicine and research.36 The SCC decision left 
intact the sections protecting human health and safety, such 
as the testing and screening of human reproductive 
materials used for assisted reproduction.37 The prohibition 
of activities deemed to be morally unacceptable (cloning, 
sex selection, discrimination, and commodification of 
human gamete donation and surrogacy) were upheld, as 
were the sections enabling enforcement of permitted 
activities, including the reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by gamete donors and surrogates.38 
 
The purpose and effect of the SCC 2010 decision, 
Ref re AHRA, centres on the use of federal criminal law 
                                                 
35  Décret 1177-2004; Décret 73-2006; Attorney General of Quebec v 
Attorney General of Canada, 2008 QCCA 1167, [2008] RJQ 1551.  
36  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27. Sections rendered ultra vires: ss 10, 11, 
13–18 and 40(2) (3), (3.1), (4) and (5) and 44(2) and (3). 
37  AHRA, supra note 8. See the new section 10, Assisted Human 
Reproductive Act, 2004 as amended in 2012.  
38  Assisted Human Reproductive Act, 2004 supra, note 8, ss 5–9. 
Discussion of the decision found in:  Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Federal 
Health Legislation and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
Reference” (2011) 74:33 Sask L Rev 41; Jonathan D Whyte 
“Federalism and Moral Regulation: A Comment on the Reference Re 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2011) 74 Sask L Rev 45; Graeme 
G Mitchell “Not a General Regulatory Power: A Comment on 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2011) 54 SCLR 
633.; AHRA, supra note 8, s 12. 
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powers to uphold morality and deter a public health evil.39 
Relying on the argument advanced by Rand J. in the 
Margarine reference, Ref re AHRA reaffirms that the “evil” 
or threat must be real and legitimate.40 The decision serves 
to remind Canadian legislators that in matters of health (an 
area of provincial constitutional responsibility), criminal 
law (when used to achieve a public purpose) is restricted to 
the suppression of a public health evil.41 It underscores that 
mere identification of public purpose is not sufficient 
justification for invoking federal criminal law powers: as 
the SCC stated, the “evil must be real and the apprehension 
of harm must be reasonable.”42 It is through this 
interpretive lens that subsequent AHRA legislative 
amendments and regulatory reform such as the one recently 
undertaken by Health Canada must be critically assessed 
and evaluated.   
 
2012 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE 
AHRA 
 
In March 2012, the federal government used omnibus tax 
legislation, Bill C-38: The Jobs, Growth and Long-term 
Prosperity Act, to amend the Assisted Human Reproductive 
                                                 
39  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 189; J-F Gaudreault-DesBiens & N 
Karazavin, “Canada’s New Reproductive Technologies: A Moral Evil 
or Signs of Beneficial Medical Progress?” (2012) Public Law 147; 
Whyte, supra note 38. 
40   Reference re Validity of Section 5 (a) Dairy Industry Act, [1949] SCR 
1, 1 DLR 433; Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 251. 
41  Ogbogu, supra note 25 at 93. 
42  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 14.  
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Act, 2004.43 The Assisted Human Reproduction Agency 
was eliminated, thereby saving the federal government 
some $10 million, though it soon became apparent that any 
fiscal savings were likely to be considerably less, given that 
the Agency had never managed to spend even half of its 
annual budget.44 Additionally, Health Canada was asked to 
assume a limited number of assisted reproduction 
regulatory, enforcement, and outreach responsibilities.45   
 
The 2012 Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity 
Act amendments also performed a legal administrative 
housekeeping function consistent with a regulatory pattern 
current at the time that resulted in the elimination of one 
regulation for every new one established.46 The sections of 
the AHRA rendered ultra vires by the SCC decision in Ref 
re AHRA were repealed. At the same time, it consolidated 
a number of related regulatory responsibilities found in 
                                                 
43  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21. 
44  Tom Blackwell “Government Shutters Agency that Oversees Canada’s 
Fertility and Assisted Reproduction Industry”, National Post (30 
March 2012), online: <nationalpost.com/news/government-shutters-
agency-that-oversees-canadas-fertility-and-assisted-reproduction-
industry>; Anne Kingston “Assisted Human Reproduction Canada: 
The Budget Cut Everyone Missed”, Maclean’s Canada (2 April 2012), 
online: <macleans.ca/society/science/assisted-human-reproduction-
canada-the-budget-cut-everyone-missed/>; Health Canada, What We 
Heard, supra note 13 at 3.1. 
45  See the critique of this administrative change presented in Baylis & 
Downie, “A Tale of Assisted Human Reproduction”, supra note 34.  
46  Laura Jones, “Cutting Red Tape in Canada: A Regulatory Reform 
Model for the United States?” (November 2015) Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University, online: 
<www.mercatus.org/system/files/Jones-Reg-Reform-British-
Columbia.pdf>. 
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other statutes. For example, sections of the AHRA 2004 that 
regulated the use of human ova and sperm under the 
Human Pathogens and Toxic Materials Act along with the 
regulation that had mandated the testing and screening 
regime for human sperm under the federal Food and Drugs 
Act were repealed47 thereby permitting human sperm and 
ova screening and testing, along with tracing and 
identification requirements, to be located wholly within the 
ambit of the AHRA at the amended section 10. The 
investigative abilities of Health Canada were strengthened 
and inspection provisions associated with the statute’s 
regulations were revised.48  
 
The 2012 AHRA amendments have been 
characterised by some scholars as a repeat performance of 
a failed legislative project, while others have been less 
generous in their criticism of Canada’s renewed legislative 
foray into the law of assisted reproduction.49 None of the 
critiques of the 2012 AHRA amendments, however, have 
examined the implications of imposing screening and 
testing regulations on an “obtained” ova “donated” by a 
traditional surrogate for use in her own surrogate 
                                                 
47  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21. 
48  Ibid. See also s 45–68 of the AHRA, supra note 8. 
49  Alana Cattapan & Sara Cohen, “The Devil We Know: The 
Implications of Bill C-38 for Assisted Human Reproduction in 
Canada” (2013) 35:7 JOGC 654 at 654; Baylis & Downie “A Tale of 
Assisted Human Reproduction”, supra note 34. 
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pregnancy50—a requirement added to the Act without 
public consultation or discussion by Parliament.51  
 
In the absence of scholarly scrutiny, we need to 
examine the implications that legislative change involving 
traditional surrogates could have for reproductive law and 
policy. If the objective is to discourage the practice, then 
the requirement to screen and test obtained own ova used 
by a traditional surrogate delivers an unexpected punitive 
punch. On the other hand, if the purpose is to protect the 
traditional surrogate and her offspring from a health harm, 
the identified health risks need to be real and the protective 
measures proportionate. Finally, if the goal is to shelter 
Canadians from the harm of a moral evil, one needs to 
determine why traditional surrogacy, when performed 
through IVF as that is the only way to “obtain” ova from a 
woman, constitutes an evil that is absent when traditional 
                                                 
50  Glenn Rivard, “Federal and Provincial Jurisdictions with Respect to 
Health: Struggles and Symbiosis” in Trudo Lemmens, Andrew 
Flavelle Martin, & Cheryl Milne, eds, Regulating Creation: The Law, 
Ethics and Policy of Assisted Reproduction (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2017) 63 at 80–82. Rivard makes no reference to the 
requirement to screen and test of surrogate ova donors.   
51  “Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget 
tabled in Parliament”, 3rd reading, House of Commons Debates, 146–
42 (18 June 2012) at 1700 (Hon Andrew Scheer); “Bill C-38, An Act 
to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament”, 
House of Commons Debates, oral questions, 146–41 (15 Jun 2012) at 
1115. Bill C-38 passed without discussion as to the amendments being 
made to the AHRA apart from Mr Wayne Marston (Hamilton East-
Stony Mountain, NDP) noting that the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Agency would be shut down and Ms Megan Leslie (Halifax, NDP) who 
asked about the fiscal savings to be achieved from the shutdown of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency: Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 41-1 (15 June 2012) at 9612. 
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surrogacy occurs as a result of artificial insemination, 
which is the more common way to undertake traditional 
surrogacy.52  
 
EXAMINATION OF 2012 AHRA SECTION 10 
AMENDMENTS 
 
The 2012 AHRA amendments at section 10 replace the 
original section 10 that was rendered ultra vires by the SCC 
in Ref re AHRA.53  The purpose of the impugned section 10 
had been to support a federally managed licencing regime 
for human gametes used in assisted human reproduction.54 
With this type of federal activity ruled constitutionally 
invalid, the federal government repositioned its legislative 
responsibilities and subsequent use of Criminal Code 
powers to fall within a human health protection mandate.  
Indeed, at subsection 10(1) the health objective of testing 
and screening of human gametes used in assisted human 
reproduction is stated as being:  
 
10(1)  The purpose of this section is to 
reduce the risks to human health and 
                                                 
52  White, “Why We Don’t Know”, supra note 30 at 64. Canada keeps no 
statistics on the practice of traditional surrogacy. The Canadian 
Assisted Reproductive Registry (CARTR-Plus) counts only gestational 
surrogate cycles. This is one of the many Assisted Human 
Reproduction data gaps that exist in Canada. The 2018 Safety of Sperm 
and Ova Regulations make no attempt to mandate an IVF registry 
documenting the number and types of sperm and ova screened and 
tested. For a commentary on traditional surrogacy practices see: Jenni 
Millbank, “Rethinking ‘Commercial’ Surrogacy in Australia” (2015) 
12:3 J Bioethical Inq 477. 
53  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21 at 717. 
54  Ref re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 93. 
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safety arising from the use of sperm 
or ova for the purpose of assisted 
human reproduction, including the 
risk of the transmission of disease. 
 
In the subsections that follow subsection 10(1), 
human sperm and ova obtained from specified types of 
donors at subsections 10(2)(a, b, c) and used by certain 
categories of female persons identified at subsections 
10(2)(a, b, c) for the purposes of  assisted reproduction may 
be exempted from testing and screening as indicted in 
subsection 10(3) and can be distributed and imported 
pursuant to subsection 10(4). At subsection 10(5) the term 
“common-law partner” is defined and at section 61, an 
amended set of penalties for failure to abide by the 
regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section 10 are 
specified. 
 
It should be noted that the AHRA prohibits all uses 
of human gametes and embryos in assisted human 
reproduction unless the activity is expressly permitted by 
regulation.55 The amendments made in 2012 preserve this 
position. As a result, assisted reproduction is characterised 
as a non-normative and unnatural activity. This 
characterization may have had salience in the 1980s when 
the practice was innovative, but it is much less defensible 
today. At section 10 the AHRA explicitly legalises a 
fertility patient’s use of their own unscreened and untested 
ova and the unscreened and tested sperm and ova of their 
                                                 
55  Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, supra note 1. The regulations are 
silent with respect to destruction of embryos no longer wanted for 
reproductive use, training, or research.  
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spouse, common-law partner, or sexual partner.56 It makes 
the reproductive use of all other unscreened and untested 
human reproductive material illegal on the grounds of 
health and safety risk.57  
 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE TYPE OF DONATED 
SPERM AND OVUM TO BE TESTED AND 
SCREENED 
 
Section 10 amendments introduced by the Jobs, Growth 
and Long-term Prosperity Act state:58  
 
10(2)  Subject to subsection (3), no person shall 
distribute, make use of or import any of the 
following for the purpose of assisted human 
reproduction: 
 
(a)  sperm that has been obtained from a 
donor and that is meant for the use of a 
female person other than a spouse, 
common-law partner or sexual partner 
of the donor; 
(b)  an ovum that has been obtained from a 
donor and that is meant for the use of a 
female person other than the donor or 
the spouse, common-law partner or 
sexual partner of the donor; or 
                                                 
56  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21, s 10(2); 
AHRA, supra note 8.  
57  Ibid.  
58  Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21 at s 714–
18.  
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(c)   an ovum that has been obtained from a 
donor and that is meant for the donor’s 
use as a surrogate mother. 
 
10(3)  Subsection (2) does not apply if: 
(a)  tests have been conducted in respect of 
the sperm or ovum in accordance with 
the regulations, and the sperm or ovum 
has been obtained, prepared, preserved, 
quarantined, identified, labelled and 
stored and its quality assessed in 
accordance with the regulations; and 
(b)  the donor of the sperm or ovum has 
been screened and tested, and the 
donor’s suitability has been assessed, in 
accordance with the regulations. 
 
10(4)  No person shall, except in accordance with 
the regulations, engage in any activity 
described in paragraph (3)(a) or (b) in 
respect of any of the following with the 
intention of distributing or making use of it 
for the purpose of assisted human 
reproduction: 
 
(a)  sperm described in paragraph (2)(a); 
(b) an ovum described in paragraph (2)(b); 
or 
(c) an ovum described in paragraph (2)(c). 
 
In subsection 10(5), “common-law partner”, in 
relation to an individual, refers to a person who is 
cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship at 
the relevant time, having so cohabited for a period of at 
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least one year.59 
 
The penalties for failure to screen, test, label, 
distribute and import as specified in the regulations are set 
out in section 61:60  
 
61    A person who contravenes any provision of 
this Act—other than any of sections 5 to 7 and 
9—or of the regulations or an order made 
under subsection 44(1) is guilty of an offence 
and 
 
(a)  is liable, on conviction on indictment, 
to    a fine not exceeding $250,000 or 
to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years, or to both; or 
(b)  is liable, on summary conviction, to a 
fine not exceeding $100,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years, or to both.61 
 
WHO IS A “DONOR” AND WHY DOES THIS 
MATTER?  
 
The above noted subsections 10(2)(a, b, and c) begin by 
identifying gametes—sperm and ovum—obtained from 
three different types of “donors”. But before we examine 
                                                 
59  Ibid at 718.  
60  Ibid at 735. 
61  Semen Processing Regulations, supra note 9. No regulations pursuant 
to the amended s 10 have been made. Penalties for failure to test and 
screen human sperm are specified in SOR/96-254 [Processing and 
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception].  
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who the “donors” are and whether their gametes need to be 
tested and screened, we need to understand what the AHRA 
means by the term “donor”. 
 
In law, the AHRA situates the act of donation— the 
giving, granting or conferring of human reproductive 
material— to the person from whose body the ovum or 
sperm was obtained.  The AHRA considers all persons 
undertaking IVF treatment to be “donors”, even if the 
“donation” is made to oneself in the form of autologous use 
or when sperm or ovum are to be used by the donor’s 
spouse, common-law or sexual partner. The AHRA at 
section 3, defines a “donor” as: 62 
 
(a)  in relation to human reproductive material, 
the individual from whose body it was 
obtained, whether for consideration or not; 
and 
(b)  in relation to an in vitro embryo, a donor as 
defined in the regulations. 
 
     The AHRA Section 8 (Consent Regulations) 
maintain the broad definition of the term “donor” and the 
“act of donation”. It specifies permitted uses, including 
own-use, third-party reproductive use, research use, and 
fertility treatment testing, which must be undertaken with 
the consent of the “donor” or “donors” in the case of an 
                                                 
62  AHRA, supra note 8, s 3.  
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embryo.63 The goal being to ensure that all fertility patients 
are able to exercise autonomy in decision-making 
regarding reproductive use and donation of excess gametes 
and embryos for training, research and reproductive uses 
of others.64 However, it should be noted that the AHRA 
Section 8 (Consent Regulations) clearly defines the “third-
party” to be a reproductive party who is separate and apart 
from the “donor” of the ova, sperm, or embryo used in 
assisted reproduction.65  
 
A major difficulty created by the AHRA definition 
of “donor” applied to the person as “donor” (noun) and the 
“act of giving” (verb) is that it encompasses both concepts 
in law: a “donor” who gives to oneself shares their title with 
a “donor” who gives human reproductive material to 
others. In so doing, it confounds and blurs common-use 
definitions of “donor” and “donation”.  The Canadian 
Oxford Dictionary, for example, defines a “donor” as a 
person who gives (donates) blood, organs, or reproductive 
tissues to a third-party.”66 Thus, the act of donation is 
defined as being other-motivated and other-directed. It is 
                                                 
63  Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, supra note 1. The Section 8 Consent 
Regulations state that a donor must provide consent for creation and 
use of an embryo: (i) for their own reproductive use; (ii) use following 
death; (iii) third-party use; and (iv) research (including IVF 
instruction).  No changes have been introduced to the Section 8 
Consent Regulations as a result of the s 10 amendments.  
64  Glenn Rivard & Judy Hunter, The Law of Assisted Human 
Reproduction (Markham: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) at 39–40. 
65  Section 8 Consent Regulations, supra note 1, ss 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii). 
66  Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed, sub verbo “donor”: “2. a person 
who provides blood for a transfusion, semen for insemination, or an 
organ or tissue for transplant”. Origin from Latin donator, donare. 
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frequently characterised as the act of “gift” giving.67  The 
AHRA however takes a much broader view of who is a 
donor and the act of giving, as it considers the donor and 
the act of donation to include the giving of a gamete or 
embryo to oneself as well as to others, including one’s 
spouse, common-law or sexual partner, in addition to the 
donation to anonymous or known third-parties for their 
reproductive use, or for research and training.  
 
To further complicate the matter, the AHRA’s 
terminology differs from language adopted by provincial 
statutes, fertility association guidelines, 2017 CAN/CSA 
Standard,68 and the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and 
Ova Regulations.69 In these examples, “donor” refers to the 
person who donates human reproductive material or 
embryos for the reproductive use by a third-party.  
                                                 
67  See Richard Morris Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human 
Blood to Social Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970).  
68  Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [BC FLA]; All Families Are Equal 
Act (Parentage and Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment), 
SO 2016, c 23 [ON All Families Act]; 2017 Can/CSA supra note 10. 
Ontario sidesteps the use of the term “donor” by making the action of 
donation of reproductive material a negative action as it concerns 
parentage: “Provision of reproductive material, embryo not 
determinative” 5(1) reads: “A person who provides reproductive 
material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction: (a) is not, by 
reason only of the provision, a parent of the child; and (b) shall not, by 
reason only of the provision, be recognized in law to be a parent of the 
child”; Jon Havelock et al, Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society 
Guidelines for Third Party Reproduction. Montreal: Canadian Fertility 
and Andrology Society, 2016 at 2, online: <cfas.ca/clinical-practice-
guidelines/> [CFAS Guidelines].  
69  Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Safety of Sperm and 
Ova Regulations” [2018 Proposed Regulations], online:   
<www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2018/2018-10-27/html/reg2-eng.html>. 
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For example, in a British Columbia case involving 
traditional surrogacy, Fitzpatrick J. determined that the 
petitioner, K.G., “does not come within the definition of a 
‘donor’ since his donation of sperm for the conception was 
for his “own reproductive use”.70 This ruling is guided by 
the British Columbia Family Law Act definition of a 
“donor” as: 
 
a person who, for the purposes of assisted 
reproduction other than for the person's own 
reproductive use, provides: 
(a) his or her own human 
reproductive material, from 
which a child is conceived; or 
(b)  an embryo created through the 
use of his or her human 
reproductive material.71  
 
The province of Ontario on the other hand sidesteps 
the use of the term “donor” by making the action of 
donation of reproductive material a negative permission as 
it concerns parentage. The All Families Are Equal Act at 
section 5.1 states: “A person who provides reproductive 
material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction, (a) 
is not, by reason only of the provision, a parent of the child; 
and (b) shall not, by reason only of the provision, be 
recognized in law to be a parent of the child.”72  
 
                                                 
70  Family Law Act (Re), 2016 BCSC 598, 80 RFL (7th) 443 at 17. 
71  BC FLA, supra note 68, s 20. 
72  ON, All Families Act, supra note 68, s 5.1. 
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    If one looks at the Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society (CFAS) publication, Guidelines for Third Party 
Reproduction, yet another definition is used. This 
document adopts a definition similar to the one cited in the 
British Columbia Family Law Act. A gamete donor is a: “a 
person who donates oocytes or sperm to a known or 
anonymous recipient for the purpose of achieving a 
pregnancy for the recipient and their partner (if 
applicable).”73 
 
Another guidance document, the 2017 CAN/CSA 
Standard, acknowledges that the AHRA provides a broader 
definition of “donor” noting that the Act defines “donor” 
as the “the individual from whose body it [human 
reproductive material] was obtained, whether for 
consideration or not.”74 The 2018 proposed Safety of 
Sperm and Ova Regulation defines a “donor” as: “an 
individual who provides reproductive tissues for use in a 
recipient who is not his or her spouse, common law partner, 
or sexual partner, in accordance with established medical 
criteria and procedures.”75   
 
Yet, upon closer inspection of the 2017 CAN/CSA 
Standard’s definition of donor, it becomes apparent that the 
notion of who is a donor is more nuanced than it appears 
on first reading. As the emphasis is on “providing” 
reproductive tissues for use in a recipient who is not his or 
her own spouse, common-law partner, or sexual partner, it 
addresses the case of sperm provided by the intended father 
                                                 
73  CFAS Guidelines, supra note 68 at 2.  
74  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10 at 17.  
75  Ibid. 
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and used to fertilise the ovum provided by the traditional 
surrogate. Sperm used in this manner would need to be 
screened and tested. Yet, it is not clear that the Standard’s 
definition fully encompasses the situation of ova provided 
by a traditional surrogate as she would be receiving her 
own human reproductive material. 
 
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations on the other hand adopts a more restrictive 
notion of donor compared with the one used throughout the 
2012 AHRA. The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement 
notes that the new prohibition introduced by the 2012 
legislative amendment at section 10 had as its purpose the 
reduction of the risks to human health and safety arising 
from the used of third-party donor sperm and ova for the 
purposes of Assisted Human Reproduction. The definition 
of donor used in the proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations refers to third-party donor sperm and or ova 
named as “donor sperm or ova” which are defined as:  
 
donor sperm or ova that has obtained from a 
donor [third-party] and is meant for use by a 
female person other than the spouse, 
common-law partner or sexual partner of the 
donor. Donor sperm or ova may be from an 
anonymous donor, a donor who acts as a 
surrogate mother, or may be from donor who 
is known to the recipient but who is not their 
spouse, common-law partner or sexual 
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partner.76  
 
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations states that a “donor of ova” includes persons 
who act as a surrogate. As the type of “surrogate” is not 
defined, it could both treatment forms of traditional 
surrogacy: i) surrogacy achieves conception through IUI 
and ii) where an ova is obtained from the surrogate and 
fertilised ex utero before being transferred back to the 
traditional surrogate. The possible expansion in the 
proposed regulation of the surrogate screening and testing 
requirements to include all traditional surrogates retains a 
certain degree of logic regarding the notion of “third-party” 
reproduction.  However, to do so would be at odds with the 
AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c).  
 
To summarize, a face-value reading of the 2017 
CAN/CSA Standard definition would lead one to conclude 
that a traditional surrogate who produced the “obtained 
ova” and who is also the recipient of it appears not to be 
captured within the scope of the definition.77 The proposed 
2018 Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulation states that a 
third-party donor includes a surrogate. However, the 
Regulation is not specific as to whether surrogate’s donated 
                                                 
76  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. Also, the 2018 Proposed 
Regulations on the Administration and Enforcement of the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, supra note 16 adds a further wrinkle to the 
definition of “donor of embryo”. For the purposes of enforcement at s 
54 of the Act in that the genetic relationship to the embryo carries more 
decisional weight in circumstances where the individual who did not 
provide genetic material (sperm or ovum) is no longer a spouse or 
common-law partner.  See s 1(1), s 1(3) and s 3(3) of the proposed 
enforcement regulations. 
77  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10 at 17. 
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third-party ova is an “obtained” ex utero ova or whether it 
includes all forms of traditional surrogacy thereby opening 
the door to mandatory screening of larger sub-set of 
surrogates.78 As gestational surrogates do not donate an 
ova they would not be caught by the mandatory screening 
and testing regime outlined by the 2018 proposed 
Regulations.  
 
The definition of “donor” is crucial to examining 
and understanding the changes made to section 10 of the 
AHRA. It sets the dividing line separating autologous and 
own-use donation from third-party donated gametes. Use 
of untested and unscreened third-party sperm and ova bears 
a criminal penalty.79  The requirement to test and screen a 
traditional surrogate’s ex utero ova as specified at 
subsection 10(2)(c) transforms her autologous use into a 
“third-party” activity. In so doing, the AHRA and 
accompanying regulations situate the traditional surrogate 
as a third-party donor who poses a health and safety threat.  
 
This sleight of hand whereby the traditional 
surrogate is both third-party ova donor and surrogate who 
uses her own ovum distances her from the fertility patient 
who uses her own gametes or the person who receives the 
ova of her spouse, common-law or sexual partner. In these 
instances, no testing and screening is required as their use 
of such ova pose no health or safety use to the recipient.  
Interestingly, it is possible to observe the effects of this 
repositioning in in the manner in which fertility treatments 
are recorded. Canadian and American fertility clinics, for 
                                                 
78  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69 at 2. 
79  AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(3). 
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example, report gestational surrogates80 as receiving 
embryos containing either “own use” or “third-party” ova. 
In all cases where a gestational surrogate receives an 
embryo labelled “own use ova”, it is in fact the intended 
mother’s ova that is being used. This occurs because the 
clinics consider the intended mother to be the fertility 
patient, not the gestational surrogate.81  
 
This paper argues that a similar reimagining occurs 
in the amendment at subsection 10(2)(c). By turning a 
traditional surrogate into a third-party donor, her ability to 
determine the use of her obtained ova will be constrained, 
especially if it means that she must agree to legally 
“donate” her ova to the intended parents. In this regard, the 
implications for consent and change in status of the 
mandatory screening and testing requirements as set out in 
AHRA section 10 and the obligations imposed by the 
Section 8 (Consent) Regulations given her newly acquired 
status as third-party donor are significant.  
 
FROM WHICH TYPE OF DONOR IS SPERM AND 
OVA TO BE SCREENED AND TESTED?  
 
To better understand the implications of the proposed 
regulatory regime, one needs to examine which type of 
                                                 
80  Canadian and US assisted reproduction registries do not report fertility 
treatments given to traditional surrogates. See White, “Why We Don’t 
Know”, supra note 30 at 64. 
81  See Kiran M Perkins et al, “Trends and Outcomes of Gestational 
Surrogacy in the United States” (2016) 106:2 Fertility & Sterility 435. 
The analysis undertaken is conducted from the perspective of the 
intended parents as they are viewed by the fertility industry to be the 
patients with the result that very little information is obtained about the 
surrogate undergoing the embryo transfer or pregnancy. 
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donor and donation triggers mandatory screening and 
testing. 
 
Sperm donors 
 
According to AHRA 2012 at subsection 10(2)(a), 
“obtained” sperm not used by the donor’s spouse, 
common-law or sexual-partner must be tested and screened 
pursuant to the criteria established by subsection 10(3). In 
principle, the approach represents no change to existing 
law.  
 
In response to the use of untested sperm that 
resulted in unfortunate transmissions of HIV, all human 
sperm used by the person other than the donor’s spouse, 
common-law or sexual partner, or imported for third-party 
reproductive use must comply with the Health Canada 
screening and testing standard instituted in 1996.82 The 
sperm testing regulations were further tightened in 2000 
after a woman contracted chlamydia trachomatis from an 
infected donor.83 
  
The text of the screening and testing amendment at 
subsections 10(3)(a) and (b) echo the procedures mandated 
                                                 
82  Ter Neuzen v Korn [1995] 3 SCR 674, 127 DLR (4th) 577; MR Araneta 
et al, “HIV Transmission through Donor Artificial Insemination” 
(1995) 273:11 JAMA 854 at 858; Processing and Distribution of 
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, supra note 9. 
83  Health Canada, Directive: Technical Requirements for Therapeutic 
Donor Insemination, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2000 [Health Canada 
Directive]; Alana Cattapan & Françoise Baylis “The Trouble with 
Paying for Sperm”, Toronto Star (9 April 2016), online: 
<www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/04/09/the-trouble-
with-paying-for-sperm.html>. 
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in the 1996 Semen Regulation, specified in the 2000 
Technical Requirements Directive, and explained in the 
Guidance document.84 It is these technical conditions for 
the screening, testing, and labelling of human sperm that 
are under review as part of the Health Canada regulation 
exercise85 and to which the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm 
and Ova Regulations and Directive would apply.86 
 
In the case of surrogates, the sperm of the intended 
father or donor sperm if used will need to be screened and 
tested for sexually communicable diseases. Given that 
gestational and traditional surrogates could know the 
sperm donor, the screening and testing regime to be applied 
could include that of the Designated Reproductive Donor 
schema specified by the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard and 
                                                 
84  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations, supra note 9; Health Canada Directive, supra note 83. 
See: Health Canada, Guidance on the Processing and Distribution of 
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations (Guide-0041), Ottawa: 
Health Canada, 2004. 
85  SOR/96-254 is controversial especially for male donors who have sex 
with males and for designated donors. See Marvel, supra note 5; See 
also Health Canada What We Heard, supra note 13 regarding 
comments received in the 2016–2017 consultation. The 2018 proposed 
Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and accompanying Directive 
contain restrictions on sperm donation by men who have sex with men 
and by women who have sex with men who have sex with men. See 
the following commentary: Rob Salerno “New Draft of Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act Continues Anti-Gay Discrimination”, Daily 
Xtra. (8 November 2018), <www.dailyxtra.com/new-draft-of-assisted-
human-reproduction-act-continues-anti-gay-discrimination-12799>. 
86  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. The accompanying 
Directives are found online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/programs/consultation-assisted-human-reproduction-
regulations/technical-directive.html> [Proposed Directives]. 
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outlined by the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations. It should be noted that “designated sperm and 
ova donors” are not a donor type identified in the AHRA 
though this type of donation has been a contested feature 
of the assisted human reproduction landscape since the 
1996 Semen Regulations were enacted.87   
 
If we look at the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard specific 
criteria for donor suitability and the required elements for 
donor selection and the screening and testing regime to be 
applied to anonymous and designated reproductive donors 
are specified.88 Compared to the 1996 Semen Regulation 
and related Directive, the restrictions imposed on 
“Designated Reproductive Donors” have been relaxed and 
the scope for designating a known donor has been widened. 
A Directed Reproductive Donor is defined in the 2017 
CAN/CSA Standard as: 
 
 a person who is the source of reproductive 
cells or tissues [including semen, ova or 
embryos (to which the donor contributed the 
spermatozoa and ovum) to a specific 
recipient, and who knows and is known by 
the recipient before donation. 
 
Notes:  
1) This term does not include a sexually 
intimate partner. See Donor. 
2) The terms “designated donor” and 
“known donor” are also used when 
                                                 
87  Marvel, supra note 5. 
88  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10. 
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referring to a “directed reproductive 
donor”.89 
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations at section 32 to section 43 like the 2017 
CAN/CSA Standard adopt a relaxation of the requirements 
for the screening and testing of the designated sperm and 
ova donor defined at section 32 as: (a) the “donor and the 
recipient know each other; and (b) the health professional 
requests the sperm or ova from a primary establishment in 
the context of a directed donation.”90 No length of time for 
knowing a donor or the basis on which a donor is known 
has been specified which might have been a precautionary 
additional measure to have included given that social 
media is increasingly used by those seeking traditional 
surrogates and gamete donors.91  
 
Also, the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations unlike the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard do not 
contain a provision recommending counselling of 
surrogates who elect to receive directed human 
reproductive material (sperm and ova). Counselling or 
mandatory requirement to provide health and safety 
information about the possible risks associated with 
waiving the post-quarantine tests for infectious diseases 
                                                 
89  Ibid.   
90  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, s 32.  
91  See research using online surrogacy contacts: Zsuzsa Berend, “The 
Romance of Surrogacy” (2012) 27:4 Sociological Forum 913 at 913–
14 [Berend, “Romance of Surrogacy”]; Zsuzsa Berend, “‘We Are All 
Carrying Someone Else’s Child!’: Relatedness and Relationships in 
Third-Party Reproduction” (2016) 118:1 American Anthropologist 24 
[Berend, “Relatedness”]. 
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would have been a prudent health and safety measure to 
have included.92 It could have been justified on the basis 
that recent US research findings indicate that only 75% of 
gestational surrogates receive counselling.93 The 
proportion of Canadian gestational and traditional 
surrogates who receive counselling is not known.  
 
    Even so, it may be difficult given the ambit of the 
AHRA to mandate fertility clinics to offer counselling to 
donors given that such an activity could be viewed as 
falling within the scope of the provision of health care 
treatment which is a provincial constitutional 
responsibility. Apart from Quebec, provincial governments 
have not sought to regulate fertility treatment.94  In Ontario, 
the 2016 Ontario All Families are Equal Act requires that 
surrogates and intended parents have a legal arrangement 
in place but access to counselling is not explicitly 
required.95 In this area of fertility treatment, Canada’s 
approach has been to leave such matters to the unelected 
                                                 
92  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10, s 17.3.1. 
93  Erika L Fuchs & Abbey B Berenson, “Screening of Gestational 
Carriers in the United States” (2016) 106:6 Fertility & Sterility 1496. 
94  An Act respecting clinical and research activities related to assisted 
procreation, CQLR 2009, c A-5.01; An Act to enact the Act to promote 
access to family medicine and specialized medicine services and to 
amend various legislative provisions relating to assisted procreation, 
Assemble Nationale Du Quebec 2015, c 25. See amendments at s 10 
regarding delivery of services and drawing up of ethical and safety 
guidelines by the Collège des médecins du Québec. 
95  In Ontario, for example, All Families Are Equal Act, supra note 68. An 
Act to amend the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Vital Statistics Act 
and various other Acts respecting parentage and related registration, 
see ss 2(2) and 7 where legal advice is required. Counselling is not 
noted. 
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professional organisations such as the CFAS to 
recommend and implement. 
 
Ova donors  
 
The 2012 amendments of the AHRA at section10(2)(b) 
specify that all human ovum used for human reproduction 
not used by the “donor” or by the “donor’s spouse, 
common-law or sexual partner” must be screened and 
tested. The 2012 AHRA amendment mandating screening 
and testing of ova used in third-party reproduction corrects 
a long-standing legislative omission identified in 2005 by 
Rivard and Hunter who recommended that the government 
take steps to regulate health and safety measures for human 
ova used in third-party reproduction.96 It is a regulatory 
modification that the federal agency, Assisted Human 
Reproduction Canada, could have brought into force prior 
to its suspension in 2012 had it used its mandate to protect 
the health and safety of Canadians. Unfortunately, it did 
not.97 At the time of the 2012 legislative amendment to the 
AHRA, Canadian clinicians welcomed this long overdue 
legislative change requiring testing and screening of ova 
used by third-parties.98  
 
                                                 
96  Rivard & Hunter, supra note 64 at 39–40, 56. 
97  Baylis & Downie, “A Tale of Assisted Human Reproduction”, supra 
note 34.  
98  Crowe, supra note 4. It has taken over four years to commence 
consultation on regulatory framework to regulate sperm and ova 
screening and testing.  
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The practice of fertility medicine has evidenced an 
increasing use of third-party donated ova.99 The change in 
practice has coincided with dramatic improvements in the 
techniques used to cryopreserve ova which is no longer 
considered to be an unproven or experimental technique. 
Research findings have failed to demonstrate superior 
pregnancy outcomes using fresh oocytes (ova) compared 
with pregnancy outcomes using vitrified egg-banked 
oocytes.100  The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement 
accompanying the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations also documents changes in fertility clinic 
practices. It observes a reliance on imported donated ova 
while at the same time commenting that it is not aware of 
any transmission of disease caused by donor ova. Even so, 
there exists a need to establish Canadian ova screening and 
testing protocols.101 
 
The 2017 CAN/CSA Standard provides operational 
guidance for the screening and testing of third-party ova 
donors, both anonymous and directed.102 It establishes the 
                                                 
99  Pamela M White, “Hidden from View: Canadian Gestational 
Surrogacy Practices and Outcomes, 2001-2012” (2016) 24:47 Reprod 
Health Matters 205 [White, “Hidden from View”].  
100  Sara Crawford et al, “Cryopreserved Oocyte versus Fresh Oocyte 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Cycles” (2017) 107:1 Fertility & 
Sterility 110; Ana Cobo et al, “Use of Cryo-banked Oocytes in an 
Ovum Donation Program: A Prospective, Randomised, Controlled 
Clinical Trial” (2010) 65:12 Annals of Obstetrical and Gynaecological 
Survey 775. 
101  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. See the preface to the 
Regulations: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement at 3.  
102  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10, ss 13.2.2–13.3. Genetic history and 
testing is specified at s 13.7. See Proposed Directives, supra note 86, s 
2.1.2 Genetic disease screening.  
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screening criteria for donation which includes the 
recording of the donor’s family genetic history and medical 
testing for diseases, and establishes the criteria for donor 
suitability evaluations.103 A similar set of requirements is 
found in the 2018 proposed Directives for Safety of Sperm 
and Ova regarding requirements for documenting family 
and medical history of the ova donor, a category that the 
2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations tells 
us includes surrogates.104  
 
Subsection 10(2)(a) of the 2012 AHRA indicates 
that ova from a woman who uses her own reproductive 
material (ova) is exempt from mandated screening and 
testing. The 2012 amendment at subsection 10(2)(b) states 
that the use of a partner’s ovum by a woman in same-sex 
married, common-law and sexual relationships carry a 
similar exemption from screening and testing.105 This type 
of ova sharing (co-mothering) among lesbian partners is 
not unknown nor uncommon, though no Canadian data 
                                                 
103  The screening and testing parameters noted here also apply to sperm 
donors.  
104  2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations supra note 69 at 
ss 22–31 for Donor Suitability and at ss 32–43 for Designated Donors. 
The Proposed Directives, supra note 86, do not specify the 
requirements for Designated Donors. Health Canada, supra note 14, 
did note that some of the consultation submissions identified concerns 
with criteria for testing and screening developed by the 2017 Can/CSA. 
The Proposed Directives at s  2.1.2 set out the criteria required for the 
medical history and genetic background of the donor.  
105  AHRA, supra note 8. 
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exists as to its prevalence.106 Yet, one needs to ask why 
Canadian legislators felt it necessary to specify that this 
type of reproductive tissue exchange was permitted by law 
and that the reason for its non-prohibition is one of health 
and safety. The AHRA at section 3 states that 
discrimination in assisted reproduction is prohibited. If 
heterosexual partners are permitted to exchange sperm and 
use their own ova, it is unclear why the same logic did not 
automatically apply to the exchange of ova between lesbian 
spouses, common-law, and sexual partners when the AHRA 
was amended in 2012.   
 
Internationally, restrictions placed on lesbian 
exchange of ova have coincided with access to assisted 
reproduction being based on sexual orientation and marital 
status. There has also been an ethical discourse suggesting 
that the medical surgery needed to remove ova from one 
partner to give to another when both are fertile constitutes 
unnecessary medical treatment and, as such, could be 
considered maleficent.107 Currently, the legality of the 
practice varies considerably across Europe depending on 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage, cohabitation and 
                                                 
106  Daniel Bodri et al, “Shared Motherhood IVF: High Delivery Rates in 
a Large Study of Treatments for Lesbian Couples Using Partner 
Donated Eggs” (2017) 36:2 Reprod Biomed Online 130; Ethics 
Committee of American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Access 
to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons: A 
Committee Opinion” (2013) 100:6 Fertility & Sterility 1524.  
107  G De Wert et al, “ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 23: Medically 
Assisted Reproduction in Singles, Lesbian and Gay Couples, and 
Transsexual People” (2014) 29:9 Hum Reprod 1859; WJ Dondorp, G 
De Wert & PMW Janssens, “Shared Lesbian Motherhood: A 
Challenge of Established Concepts and Frameworks” (2010) 25:4 Hum 
Reprod 812. 
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sexual partnerships. Countries like Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Netherlands, UK, Portugal and Spain permit it, 
while others such France or Germany prohibit or actively 
discourage it.108 In the UK when the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act was amended in 2008 to remove the 
need for a father and lesbian partners were recognised as 
legal parents the practice has become more common.109 In 
the UK, the motivation driving this type of legislative 
change was more focussed on ensuring that all parties can 
exercise informed consent, rather than on the regulation of 
the health and safety of the practice.110  
 
By not imposing prohibitions on the use by a 
fertility patient of the ova donated by her spouse, common-
law or sexual partner, Canada’s AHRA normalizes same-
sex female relationships.111 It accords the exchange of ova 
between female spouses, common-law, and sexual partners 
an equivalency status with autologous ova used by a 
woman in a heterosexual married, common-law, or sexual 
relationship. Specification that the sharing of ova between 
women engaged in a same-sex spousal, common-law or 
sexual relationship also serves to note that the federal 
government considers that the practice holds a no greater 
health risk to the lesbian recipient than would be 
experienced to exist for any other woman using her own 
ova or in the case of a heterosexual women from receiving 
                                                 
108  Bodri et al, supra note 106 at 130 (see: Table 1). 
109  See Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani, “Gender and 
Parenthood: The Case for Realignment” (2008) 16:2 Med Law Rev 261 
at 278–79. 
110  Ibid.  
111  AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(2)(b). 
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a transfer of sperm obtained from her male spouse, 
common-law, or sexual partner.  
 
However, the reason for allowing equal treatment 
for the use of shared gametes among spouses, common-
law, and sexual partners regardless of sexual orientation 
appears to be reliant on a health and safety rationale rather 
than legal marital equivalency and the right to equal 
treatment.112 As was ruled by the SCC in Andrews v. Law 
Society of British Columbia (1989), “discrimination may 
be described as any distinction, conduct or action, whether 
intentional or not, but based on a person’s sexual 
orientation, that has the effect of either imposing burdens 
on an individual or group that are not imposed upon others, 
or withholding or limiting access to opportunity, benefits 
and advantages available to other members of society.”113 
The amendment could have referenced the principle of 
non-discrimination that underlies Canada’s AHRA which 
holds that “persons who seek to undergo assisted 
reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against, 
including on the basis on their sexual orientation or marital 
status.”114  However, there is no mention of this principle 
in the rationale provided at section 10(1) of the 2012 
AHRA.  
 
                                                 
112  AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(1); Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, 
[2004] 3 SCR 698; Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33; Andrews v Law 
Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1; Law 
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 
497, 170 DLR (4th) 1; Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR 
(4th) 609. 
113  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, supra note 112 at 174. 
114  AHRA, supra note 8, s 2(e). 
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It is unfortunate that the government did not use the 
2012 legislative opportunity to indicate that co-
motherhood assisted reproduction has been permitted since 
the inception of the AHRA, notwithstanding any stated 
ethical concerns advanced by those arguing that intra-
couple egg sharing for nonmedical reasons could be 
considered to be ethically non-justifiable, risky, and not 
cost-effective.115 Such argumentation is weak and 
profoundly dismissive of the reproductive autonomy of 
lesbians.116 Moreover, little empirical research exists to 
support claims that the practice is any more risky compared 
to the harm endured by other patients undertaking ovarian 
stimulation related to third-party ova donation or for their 
own reproductive use.117 This is an example of where the 
federal government has embedded a health and safety 
justification for permitting co-mothering and the exchange 
of ova between queer spouses and common-law and sexual 
partners rather than adopting an equality-based rationale as 
enabled by section 3 of the AHRA.  
 
Traditional surrogates 
 
The amendment at subsection 10(2)(c) created another 
group of regulated autologous ova donors and users: 
traditional surrogates. So, to situate the discussion in the 
context of Canadian surrogacy law and policy, the legality 
of surrogacy will be briefly reviewed.  
                                                 
115  Bodri et al, supra note 106 at 131; S Marina et al, “Sharing 
Motherhood: Biological Lesbian Co-mothers, a New IVF Indication” 
(2010) 25:4 Hum Reprod 938. 
116  De Wert et al, supra note 107; Dondorp, De Wert & Janssens, supra 
note 107. 
117  Bodri et al, supra note 106. 
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SURROGACY: “MORAL EVIL”  
 
The AHRA establishes that surrogacy is legal in Canada as 
long the surrogate does not receive consideration 
(payment) though reimbursement of acceptable expenses is 
permitted.118 Traditional surrogacy, where the surrogate is 
genetically related to the child she bears for intended 
parent(s), and gestational surrogacy, where the surrogate is 
not genetically related to her offspring, are permitted.119  
 
The practice of a woman conceiving and carrying a 
child for an individual or couple who for medical or social 
reasons are unable to have their own children has been 
characterised as morally troubling as it disrupts the 
normative view of motherhood.120 The practice of 
surrogacy and its potential for exploitation has been a 
controversial topic for Canadians.121 Concerns about 
commercialisation of human reproduction, the practice of 
                                                 
118  AHRA, supra note 8, s 12. See also the 2018 Proposed Regulations, 
supra note 16. 
119  AHRA, supra note 8, s 6. 
120  Samantha Ashenden, “Reproblematising Relations of Agency and 
Coercion: Surrogacy” in S Madhock, A Phillips & K Wilson, eds, 
Gender, Agency and Coercion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 
195–218; Elly Teman, Birthing a Mother, (California: University of 
California Press, 2010). 
121  Nelson, supra note 3 at 326–8; Anne Phillips, Our Bodies, Whose 
Property?, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) at 65–96. 
Much disagreement exists concerning the moral evil of paid surrogacy. 
See also Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, “Revisiting ‘The Handmaid’s 
Tale’: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate 
Mothers” (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 13; Julie Shapiro, “For a Feminist 
Considering Surrogacy: Is Compensation Really the Key Question?” 
(2014) 89 Wash L Rev 1345. 
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traditional surrogacy, and the “moral panic” raised by the 
1984 Baby M incident cast a long shadow over the 
deliberations of assisted reproduction undertaken by the 
1983 Baird Commission, parliamentary committees, and 
parliamentarians.122 The banning of commercial surrogacy 
by the AHRA conformed to the national narrative 
privileging the unpaid donation of blood, organs, and 
tissues, and reflected a desire on the part of regulators to 
avoid an American approach to the practice of fertility 
medicine.123  
 
However, considerable social change has taken 
place in Canada since the Baird Commission held public 
consultations on the topic of assisted reproduction, 
including surrogacy. Twenty-first century Canada has 
witnessed the legalisation of same-sex marriage. IVF 
surrogacy costs for cis gay couples were covered by 
                                                 
122  In the Matter of Baby M, 217 NJ Super 313 (Ch Div 1987) rev’d 109 
MJ 396 (1988); David Snow, “Criminalizing Commercial Surrogacy 
in Canada and Australia: The Political Construction of ‘National 
Consensus’” (2016) 51:1 Austl J Poli Sci 1 at 4; Baird Commission, 
supra note 33; House of Commons, supra note 33 at 12; Busby & Vun, 
supra note 121; Nelson, supra note 3. In Baby M, a paid traditional 
surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead bonded with the child she agreed to 
carry for Mr and Mrs Stern and contested the agreement to hand over 
the child to the Sterns. The nature of the commercial surrogacy 
transaction and ensuing court decisions created considerable tension 
among ethicists, feminists, and lawyers. A good overview is found at: 
Rayven Monique, “Baby M: Traditional Surrogacy Gone Wrong—
What Really Happened with Mary Beth Whitehead”, online:   
<http://information-on-surrogacy.com/baby-m>. 
123  Snow, supra note 122 at 4. 
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Quebec’s IVF funded program.124 Since 2016, Ontario has 
paid IVF and IUI costs incurred by gestational and 
traditional surrogates.125 Gradually provincial 
governments have been updating family law statutes to 
reflect parentage made possible by assisted conception, 
including traditional and gestational surrogacy.126 
 
It is not surprising that there now exists growing 
evidence that for an increasing number of childless 
Canadian couples and individuals, surrogacy may be the 
only way to have biological children.127 For example, a 
2012 survey revealed that one-quarter of Canadian 
childless adult women and 40 percent of childless adult 
men would consider using a surrogate should they or their 
partner be unable to carry and give birth to their biological 
                                                 
124  Civil Marriage Act, supra note 112; “Quebec to Reimburse Gay Men 
for Surrogacy Costs, Celebrity Radio Host Joël Legendre and Husband 
First to Receive Coverage in Quebec”, CBC News (24 April 2014), 
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-to-reimburse-
gay-men-for-surrogacy-costs-1.2620309>. 
125  In Ontario, surrogates are eligible or IVF and AI under the Ontario 
Fertility Treatment program. FOI Request A-2017-00-00166 made by 
Pamela White to Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 1 
September 2017. Repeat request made one year later (September 3, 
2018) affirmed the situation. 
126  BC FLA, supra note 68; Family Law Act, SA 2003, F-4.5; All Families 
Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related Registrations Statute Law 
Amendment), SO 2016, c 23; Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 
“Assisted Reproduction: Legal Parentage and Birth Registration” 
(April 2014), Issue Paper, online: 
<www.manitobalawreform.ca/pubs/pdf/additional/assisted_reproducti
on-legal_parentage_and_birth_registration.pdf>. 
127  White, “Hidden from View”, supra note 99. 
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child.128 It is not uncommon to read news articles detailing 
surrogacy experiences told from various perspectives.129 
Research with North American surrogates has shown that 
this demographic consists primarily of middle-class, 
college educated, heterosexual married women who have 
had non-problematic pregnancies and who undertake the 
practice for altruistic reasons regardless of the 
commercial/non-commercial regime in which they 
operate.130  
 
Given this emerging acceptance of and growing 
practice of gestational and traditional surrogacy,131 it is 
                                                 
128  Judith C Daniluk & Emily Koert, “Childless Canadian Men’s and 
Women’s Childbearing Intentions, Attitudes towards and Willingness 
to Use Assisted Human Reproduction” (2012) 27:8 Hum Reprod 2405.  
129  See e.g. Robert Cribb & Emma Jarratt “Made in Canada: A Surrogate’s 
Supporting Cast”, Toronto Star (28 September 2016), online: 
<www.thestar.com/news/world/2016/08/28/made-in-canada-a-
surrogates-supporting-cast.html>; A Lau “My Co-worker Gave Birth 
to My Baby”, Chatelaine Magazine (18 April 2014), online: 
<www.chatelaine.com/health/coworker-gave-birth-to-my-baby/>; 
Karine Ewart, Claire Tansey & Tracy Moore “Candid Chat about 
Surrogacy” Chatelaine Magazine (18 March 2014), online: 
<www.chatelaine.com/living/cityline/can-you-pay-a-surrogate-in-
canada/>. 
130  Busby & Vun, supra note 120; Heather Jacobson, Labor of Love, (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016); Berend, “Romance of 
Surrogacy”, supra note 91; Berend, “Relatedness”, supra note 91; 
Marcin Smietana, “Affective De-Commodifying, Economic De-
Kinning: Surrogates’ and Gay Fathers’ Narratives in U.S. Surrogacy” 
(2017) 22 Sociological Research Online 5. 
131  “As Demand for Surrogacy Soars, More Countries are Trying to Ban 
It”, The Economist (13 May 2017), online: 
<www.economist.com/news/international/21721926-many-feminists-
and-religious-leaders-regard-it-exploitation-demand-surrogacy>. 
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difficult to support the view that a “moral evil” rationale 
could be the justification for imposing a prohibition on the 
use of unscreened and untested obtained own-use ova used 
by an altruistic traditional surrogate in her own pregnancy. 
Thus, the reason must be as stated in the preamble to the 
amendment: it is to combat “health evil”. The question that 
needs to be answered is: to whom does the harm occur?  
 
IDENTIFYING THE HEALTH EVIL EMBODIED 
IN THE “OBTAINED” OVUM “DONATED” BY A 
WOMAN AND USED IN HER SURROGATE 
PREGNANCY  
 
The 2012 AHRA, as amended at section 10, applies 
criminal law sanctions to address the “health and safety 
evils” posed by a woman’s own “obtained” ovum being 
used in her surrogate pregnancy. The paper will attempt to 
determine what could be the health and safety risks posed 
by “obtained” traditional surrogate ova. It seeks to 
ascertain whether use of unscreened and untested obtained 
traditional surrogate ova warrants criminalisation.  
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO THE 
TRADITIONAL SURROGATE 
 
Does the use of one’s own untested and unscreened ova 
jeopardize the health and safety of traditional surrogate 
patient? As the traditional surrogate is the recipient of her 
own human reproductive material it seems illogical to 
suggest that a woman using her own ova in her own 
surrogate pregnancy faces a greater health risk than do 
other women who use their own ova or the ova of their 
spouse or common-law or sexual partner. For a traditional 
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surrogate, one could well argue that the greater health risk 
arises from the sperm used to fertilise her ova. 
 
If the concern is that of transmission of a disease to 
the child conceived as a result of assisted reproduction, 
medical testing of the surrogate mother such as 
recommended by the CFAS in the 2016 Guidelines for 
Third-party Reproduction would detect the presence of 
HIV, Hepatitis C or other communicable disease.132 It 
should be noted however that it is recommended medical 
practice for all IVF mothers, and not just traditional and 
gestational surrogates, to be tested.133   
 
Yet, one could successfully argue that it is the act 
of “obtaining” the ova that poses a health risk, though in 
this case it occurs to the woman herself. Ovarian hyper-
stimulation syndrome (OHSS) is a serious fertility 
treatment complication, one which could result in the death 
of the patient.134 While OHSS is thought to affect 
approximately 1.8% of all IVF cycles,135 it nonetheless 
represents one the most important negative health 
outcomes associated with modern IVF practice.136 It should 
be noted that little to no study of Canadian fertility patients’ 
                                                 
132  CFAS Guidelines, supra note 68 at 24.  
133  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10.   
134  MS Kupka et al, “Assisted Reproductive Technology in Europe, 2010: 
Results Generated from European Registers by ESHRE” (2014) 29:10 
Hum Reprod 2099. 
135  Theoni B Tarlatzi et al, “What Is the Best Predictor of Severe Ovarian 
Hyper-Stimulation Syndrome in IVF? A Cohort Study” (2017) 34:10 J 
Assist Reprod Gen 1341 at 1344–45 
136  Ibid.  
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experience of OHSS has been conducted and the annual 
release of limited information from the IVF Directors’ 
assisted human reproduction registry (CARTR Plus) 
provides minimal insight on the occurrence of this etiology 
in Canadian fertility clinics.137 It needs to be noted, 
however, that Health Canada has limited ability to legislate 
in this area as fertility treatment is the practice of medicine 
which is a provincial constitutional responsibility.  
 
Given the above analysis, the health and safety risk 
to traditional surrogates of using their own ova cannot be 
the reason for mandatory screening and testing of obtained 
ova and the imposition of criminal code sanctions applied 
in the event that the specified screening and testing fails to 
occur. The harm test established by the SCC in Ref re 
AHRA cannot be said to have been fulfilled with respect to 
the existence of a health and safety harm occurring to the 
recipient of the traditional surrogate’s obtained ova. It is 
the surrogate herself who is exposed to the “obtained” ova 
and in this regard her risk is no more or less-greater than 
another other IVF recipient of her own ova or the ova or 
her spouse, common-law or sexual partner.  
 
                                                 
137  Between 2001 and 2012, CFAS published a more detailed report on 
OHSS. This ended with the transfer of the Canadian Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Registry (CARTR) to Better Outcomes 
Registry for Newborns (BORN). See CFAS website for annual media 
announcement on IVF success rates, online: <www.cfas.ca>. 
Considerable research is being conducted elsewhere. See e.g. Ruth 
Howie & Vanessa Kay, “Controlled Ovarian Stimulation for In-Vitro 
Fertilization” (2018) 79:4 B JH M 194; Cindy Farquhar et al, 
“Management of Ovarian Stimulation for IVF: Narrative Review of 
Evidence Provided for World Health Organization Guidance” (2017) 
35:1 Reprod Biomed Online 3. 
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HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO CLINIC STAFF 
AND PATIENTS 
  
Most human sperm, ova, and embryos used and stored in 
IVF clinics are “autologous use” having been obtained 
from the fertility patient and their spouse, common-law, or 
sexual partner. These obtained sperm, ova and embryos are 
intended to be used in the fertility treatments of these 
individuals.138 Autologous use gametes and embryos are 
not subject to mandatory screening and testing, though 
fertility patients, spouses, and partners must undergo a 
series of related medical tests, including ones capable of 
detecting the existence of sexually transmitted diseases.139  
The parties may also decide to undertake pre-natal genetic 
testing or subject their own human reproductive material to 
genetic screening and testing to prevent the transmission of 
genetic diseases to their offspring.  Such decisions are 
made by the parents of the child conceived as a result of 
assisted reproduction.   
 
As it concerns the risk of the transmission of 
communicable diseases, Canadian fertility clinics have 
been encouraged to follow human reproductive material 
                                                 
138  Data from the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Technology 
Registry CARTR-Plus show that 95% of IVF patients use their own 
gametes though over 50% of gestational surrogates receive embryos 
containing ova from a donor other than the intended mother. See 
White, “Hidden from View”, supra note 99. 
139  See for example literature on transmission of viral diseases: AM Abou-
Setta, “Transmission Risk of Hepatitis C Virus via Semen During 
Assisted Reproduction: How Real Is It?” (2004) 19:12 Hum Reprod 
2711; A Garolla et al, “Sperm Viral Infection and Male Infertility: 
Focus on HBV, HCV, HIV, HPV, HSV, HCMV, and AAV” (2013) 
100:1 J Reprod Immunol 20. 
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and embryo labelling and to adopt handling and storage 
protocols designed to prevent cross-contamination and 
misidentification.140 It appears that Canadian IVF clinics 
have voluntarily embraced the procedures and protocols 
developed by the Standards Council of Canada to prevent 
contamination and mislabelling, though to date no 
monitoring information informs Canadian consumers 
about compliance.141 The 2017 CAN/CSA Standard 
recommends that fertility clinics ensure that Standard 
Operating Procedures are in place to address health and 
safety requirements regarding sperm, ova and embryo 
preparation and preservation, and packaging, storage, and 
the cleaning and maintenance of cryopreservation tank 
containers.142  The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations specify the standard operational procedures 
that are to be followed as well as requiring that the 
documentation and reporting of adverse reactions.143  
 
                                                 
140  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10. The 2018 Proposed Regulations, supra 
note 69 require that establishment identify (ss 44–45), label (ss 46–47), 
undertake quality management (ss 48–51), internal audit (s 52), 
establish standard operating procedures (ss 53–60), address error 
reporting (ss 61–68) and adverse reactions (ss 69–73), and support 
reports and record keeping (ss 74–77). It is not the place of this paper 
to examine the adequacy of the proposed procedures intended to 
manage the safety of sperm and ova used in human reproduction.  
141  Perhaps the best indicator is Accreditation Canada clinic evaluations 
conducted at the request of the IVF clinic, a practice encouraged by the 
Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society. See Accreditation Canada, 
Assisted Reproduction Standards for Clinical Services, online: 
<store.accreditation.ca/collections/assisted-reproductive-technology-
art>.  
142  2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10, s 15. See also ss 15. 4, 15.6. 
143  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, ss 67–69. 
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In light of the above information, it is difficult to 
sustain the argument that unscreened and untested ova 
obtained from a traditional surrogate represent a greater 
risk to IVF clinic staff and other patients than autologous 
ova and embryos stored, cryopreserved and handled by the 
clinic. Thus, the expectation that ova obtained from a 
traditional surrogate poses significant health risks to the 
routine operation of IVF clinics or to other patients cannot 
be the rationale for the imposition of mandatory testing and 
screening.   
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN 
BORN TO TRADITIONAL SURROGATES 
 
The preamble to the AHRA includes a section setting out 
ethical principles guiding the practice of assisted 
reproduction in Canada. The importance of beneficence 
and non-malfeasance in the practice of fertility techniques 
underscores subsection 2(a) of the Act which states that 
“the health and well-being of children born through the 
application of assisted human reproductive technologies 
must be given priority in all decisions respecting their 
use.”144  The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement 
accompanying the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations notes that transmission of a communicable 
diseases and the risk of transmitting a serious genetic 
maladies to a child conceived using donor ova compels 
Health Canada to mitigate potential risks to human health 
and safety that could result from the use of donor ova.”145  
 
                                                 
144  AHRA, supra note 8, s 2(a). 
145  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69 at 3. 
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As already noted, traditional and gestational 
surrogates who receive treatment at Canadian fertility 
clinics are tested to establish their communicable disease 
status and to assess their ability to successfully conceive 
and bear children. The voluntary Third-Party 
Reproduction Guidelines developed by Canadian Fertility 
and Andrology Society apply regardless of the fertility 
treatment a surrogate may receive—ovarian stimulation, 
IVF embryo transfer, and artificial insemination.146  
 
Regulating the screening and testing of a traditional 
surrogate for communicable health conditions and 
documentation of medical, genetic, and family history 
would provide additional health and safety assurances to 
commissioning parents that the surrogate-related child 
would not be prone to serious health or genetic conditions 
inherited from the traditional surrogate. The acquisition of 
obtained ova also enables preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) and karyotyping, processes that permit 
detection of genetic defects and anomalies including 
trisomy and determination of risks for serious genetic 
disease.147 These genetic screening tests are not mandated 
by the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
Regulations or specified in the proposed Directive even 
though they would provide greater assurance of genetic 
                                                 
146  CFAS Guidelines, supra note 73 at 24. 
147  Trisomy 21 is commonly referred to as Downs Syndrome. It is but one 
of the more frequently occurring variants of trisomy (e.g. 18 and 13). 
Regarding screening options see Melissa Hill et al, “Has Non-Invasive 
Prenatal Testing Impacted Termination of Pregnancy and Birth Rates 
of Infants with Down Syndrome?” (2017) 37:13 Prenat Diagnosis 
1281. 
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disease detection which is after all the raison d'être for the 
proposed mandatory testing and screening.  
 
If testing and screening documentation obtained as 
result of screening and testing described by the 2018 
proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and set out 
in the proposed Directive was made available to surrogate-
born children, they would have potentially crucial 
information about their genetic parentage and medical 
history. It should be noted that AHRA does not mandate that 
medical, personal and family history information be 
obtained from a gestational surrogate nor when traditional 
surrogacy is undertaken using assisted insemination, which 
is the more common practice compared with IVF.148 Thus, 
there is a strong likelihood that an uneven collection of 
personal information is likely to occur as more personal 
health data and medical history information will be 
acquired in the isolated and rare instances where ova of a 
traditional surrogate are obtained.  
 
Without a donor registry, there exists no formal 
means for a donor-conceived child or a traditional 
surrogate conceived child to learn about their biological 
parents. Without parental disclosure, no mechanism exists 
enabling them to know that they were a surrogate-born 
child or that sperm or ova have been provided by persons 
other than their social (intended) parents. Such information 
could be important, especially as our understanding of the 
implications of epi-genetic phenomena increases and in 
                                                 
148  As already noted, the 2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, are 
not clear as to whether all traditional surrogates are to be screened and 
tested as third-party donors. 
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cases where inherited biological traits may have long-term 
medical and intergenerational health consequences.  
 
Canada’s federal donor registry, as envisaged by 
the AHRA, was ruled ultra vires by the Supreme Court 
decision in Ref re AHRA.149 Provincial gamete and embryo 
donor registries do not exist. Submissions made to Health 
Canada as part of the consultation on regulatory change 
identified a need for them.150 The 10 year record keeping 
requirement specified in the 2018 proposed Safety of 
Sperm and Ova Regulations will not fill this information 
gap.151 Given that no Canadian donor registry exists, there 
is no organised and managed system that will enable the 
offspring of traditional surrogates to access the information 
obtained as a result of a screening and testing regime.152 As 
the decision in Pratten v. British Columbia demonstrates, 
knowing one’s genetic history is not a constitutional 
right.153  
 
Information indicating that one has been conceived 
using donor sperm and/or ova is not recorded on birth 
                                                 
149  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 ruled AHRA s 19 ultra vires.  
150  Health Canada, What We Heard, supra note 13 at 3.  
151  See 2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, s 77(1) “Records”.  
152  This also applies to the off-spring of gestational surrogates. See 2017 
CAN/CSA, supra note 10 at Table 2. 
153  Pratten v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 480, 357 DLR (4th) 660; 
Vanessa Gruben & Daphne Gilbert, “Donor Unknown: Assessing the 
Section 15 Right of the Donor-Conceived Offspring” (2011) 27:2 Can 
J Fam L 247; Vanessa Gruben, “A Number but No Name: Is there a 
Constitutional Right to Know One’s Sperm Donor in Canadian Law” 
in Trudo Lemmens, Andrew Flavelle Martin, & Cheryl Milne, eds, 
supra note 50 at 145. 
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registration forms, though it could be if Canadian 
provinces were to follow the example set by the states of 
Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, and Connecticut.154 
However, to do so would involve legislative change. The 
BC Vital Statistics Act, for example, prevents assisted 
human conception information from being recorded on 
birth registration.155 In other provinces, vital statistics 
legislation is silent on the matter, though the activities of 
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada provide Canadian 
provinces the opportunity to consider the option.156 In the 
absence of intended parents providing information about 
donors and surrogates, traditional surrogate-born children, 
like gestational surrogate-born children and other donor-
conceived children, must look elsewhere to locate donor 
profile information and siblings, including, for example, 
                                                 
154  Bruce Cohen et al, “Accuracy of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Information on Birth Certiﬁcates: Florida and Massachusetts, 2004–
06” (2014) 28:3 Paediat Perinat Epidemiol 181 at 182. 
155  Vital Statics Act, RSBC 1996 c 479, s 14.1: “If a child is born in British 
Columbia as a result of assisted reproduction, nothing must appear on 
any certificate issued by the registrar general that would disclose that 
the child was born as a result of assisted reproduction.”  
156  British Columbia Law Institute, “Uniform Vital Statistics Act 
(Renewal) Project”, online: <www.bcli.org/project/uniform-vital-
statistics-act-project>. Uniform Law Conference of Canada is 
undertaking review of Canada’s Vital Statistics statutes, see the August 
2017 meeting report: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, “Uniform 
Vital Statistics Act 1987 (Renewal) Report of the Working Group” 
(Kathleen Cunningham & Leslie Turner), online: 
<ulcc.ca/images/stories/2017_pdf_en/2017ulcc0025.pdf>. 
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sperm and ova banks, the IVF clinic that performed the 
treatments, and the Donor Sibling Registry.157  
 
Research shows that surrogates often bond with 
intended parents158 and findings from UK studies 
demonstrate that gestational and traditional surrogates, 
intended parents, and surrogate-born children can maintain 
positive and supportive post-birth relationships.159 In 
Canada, given the lack of a donor registry, the maintenance 
of relationships with intended parents between surrogates 
takes on heightened importance, as this may be the only 
way for the traditional surrogate-born child to learn about 
their genetic background. One advantage of the easing of 
the restrictions imposed on designated donation could be 
the facilitation of on-going contacts between sperm and 
ova and surrogates including traditional surrogates.  
 
Yet if non-malfeasance is the rationale invoked for 
application of criminal law powers to the screening and 
testing of only the traditional surrogates who undergo IVF 
                                                 
157  Vasanti Jadva et al, “Experiences of Offspring Searching for and 
Contacting Their Donor Siblings and Donor” (2010) 20 Reprod 
Biomed Online 523; The Donor Sibling Registry, “Homepage”, online: 
<www.donorsiblingregistry.com>; Emily Chung, Melanie Glanz & 
Vik Adhopia “Donor-Conceived People are Tracking Down their 
Biological Even if they Want to Hide”, CBC News (6 January 2018), 
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/technology/sperm-donor-dna-testing-
1.4500517>. 
158  Berend, “Romance of Surrogacy”, supra note 91; Berend, 
“Relatedness”, supra note 91.  
159  Susan Imrie & Vasanti Jadva, “The Long-Term Experiences of 
Surrogates: Relationships and Contact With Surrogacy Families in 
Genetic and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements” (2014) 29:4 Reprod 
BioMed Online 424. 
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treatment, surely as an underlying AHRA ethical principle, 
it is owed to all offspring of traditional surrogates, 
regardless of the location of the ova at time of 
conception.160 The amended AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c) 
represents, at best, a limited interpretation of compassion 
for the donor-conceived. As it concerns an application of 
criminal code powers, surely a more proportionate 
approach would have been to have left the screening and 
testing including the collection of surrogate medical and 
genetic information to the provincial medical bodies to 
regulate.  This way the information could have been 
obtained from all persons undergoing surrogacy not just 
those persons who undergo the more medically invasive 
treatments associated with IVF. There remains the need for 
a Registry so that children can have access to the 
information for health, medical and social reasons.  The 
2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations do 
not achieve this larger objective.   
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY HARM OF AN 
“OBTAINED” TRADITIONAL SURROGATE’S 
OVUM 
 
On careful examination, it is difficult to determine how ova 
obtained from a traditional surrogate and used in her own 
pregnancy represents a health and safety harm to the 
recipient—the traditional surrogate—so significant as to 
justify the application of criminal code sanctions on those 
who would fail to screen and test it prior to its use.  The 
argument for testing to prevent genetic disease to the 
                                                 
160  Vincent Couture et al, “Strengths and Pitfalls of Canadian Gamete and 
Donor Registries: Searching for Beneficent Solutions” (2014) 28:3 
Reprod Biomed Online 369.  
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surrogate-born child is a stronger justification though due 
to its application to a very small number of traditional 
surrogate-born children the sanctions appear to be are 
disproportionate to the overall benefit especially when 
medical testing for communicable diseases already occurs 
for surrogates. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL 
SURROGATES OF AHRA AMENDMENTS 
CONCERNING THE TESTING AND SCREENING 
OF OVA 
 
We now need to examine some of the legal implications of 
subsection 10(2)(c). By requiring screening and testing of 
an obtained ova donated by a woman and used in her 
surrogate pregnancy, the AHRA appears to transform a 
traditional surrogate’s ova by means of law and regulation 
into a “third-party” body part notwithstanding her genetic 
affinity to it. Moreover, once the obtained ovum has been 
transferred back into her body, decisions made throughout 
the pregnancy and on the birth of the child as to whether 
she will fulfil the surrogacy arrangement will be hers to 
make.  
 
It is also important to note that the act of obtaining 
an ovum from a traditional surrogate is rare. Neither the 
U.S. nor the Canadian assisted reproduction registries 
provide information on traditional surrogacy undertaken 
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using assisted insemination or IVF.161 If we look at 
provincial programs, the Ontario Fertility Program for 
example, began funding IVF and assisted insemination for 
surrogate patients in 2016. Under this program, it is 
possible for a woman who has been or plans to be a 
surrogate (traditional or gestational) to receive ovarian 
stimulation for her own fertility uses. The program does not 
prevent her from using her own “obtained” ova in her own 
traditional surrogate pregnancy or in her own pregnancy. 
Regrettably, the Ontario program does not track surrogate 
treatments, and as such no information is available on the 
uptake of this program by surrogates or of the outcomes.162  
 
It is worth noting that the Ontario program 
considers “gestational and traditional surrogates” to be 
patients even though the clinic which undertakes the 
treatment refers to the intended parents as the “fertility 
patients” and the data collected by them regarding the 
treatments involving the surrogate (traditional and 
gestational) is recorded from the perspective of the 
intended parent.163  Review of the labelling system 
described in the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova 
                                                 
161  For the U.S., see S Sunderam et al, “Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Surveillance - United States, 2015” (2018) 67:3 MMWR 
Surveillance Summaries 1; For Canada, see Better Outcomes & 
Registry Network Ontario, “CARTR-Plus”, online: 
<www.bornontario.ca/en/partnership-projects/cartr-plus>, annual 
reports are no longer disseminated. Also consult the website of the 
Canadian Fertilization and Andrology Society at <www.cfas.ca>. See 
also White, “Why We Don’t Know”, supra note 30.  
162  FOI Request A-2017-00-00166 made by Pamela M White to Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 1 September 2017.  
163  White, “Why We Don’t Know”, supra note 30 at 71–74. 
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Regulations for third-party donors raises questions about 
its ability to address the situation where the surrogate 
“donor” and the “recipient” are one in the same person and 
where the ova could be used in the person’s own 
pregnancy, in a surrogate pregnancy, or by another party 
such as the intended mother. The proposed data recording 
system appears to label the ova provided by a traditional 
surrogate and used in her own pregnancy as a third-party 
donor gamete. It codes the type of screening and testing 
that was undertaken and documentation regarding storage 
and handling. It is the “donor code” that links the donation 
to the donor.164  
 
Muddled terminology about who is the fertility 
patient and when someone becomes a “third-party” 
reproductive actor (surrogate and donor) reveals the 
potential for problems in the area of consent to donate for 
use by the traditional surrogate in her own surrogate 
pregnancy, consent to donate for the use by the intended 
mother in her own pregnancy, or consent to use by the 
donor in her own non-surrogate pregnancy. Under such 
circumstances, law and regulation create liminal legal 
figures. As described above the “ova” and the donor, in this 
case the traditional surrogate, assume a betwixt and 
between legal reproductive status. Confusion regarding 
who has authority to use an ova can occur especially when 
roles become mutable and interchangeable. The case of a 
BC traditional surrogate, Ms. Chonn, is one recent example 
of such an occurrence.    
 
Ms. Chonn acting as a traditional surrogate for 
intended parents had undergone ovarian stimulation and 
                                                 
164  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, ss 44–47. 
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had agreed to have her obtained ova fertilised using the 
sperm of the intended father.165  Embryos not used in Ms. 
Chonn’s first surrogate pregnancy were cryopreserved and 
stored by the IVF clinic.166 Sometime later, an embryo 
containing her ovum and the sperm of the intended father 
was transferred to the uterus of the intended mother. Ms. 
Chonn has indicated that she was not informed that the 
embryo containing her ovum had been transferred to the 
intended mother and that the use of the embryo occurred 
without her knowledge and written consent. Ms. Chonn as 
the ova donor is genetically related to the child 
subsequently born to intended mother. Her role as a 
traditional (genetic) surrogate is important to her and she 
has stated that she “. . . couldn't fathom someone else 
carrying her child.”167 The outcome of this situation has 
been especially stressful for her especially in light of the 
fact that she has lost contact with the parents and her 
genetic off-spring.168   
 
This case exhibits a number of characteristics 
common to assisted reproduction. Reproductive roles can 
be variable and interchangeable. Creation of human life 
and the intermixing of family and relational bonds are 
complex and potentially contested. Rules regarding the 
                                                 
165  Eric Rankin “’Another Woman Gave Birth to My Child’: Surrogate 
Sues Fertility Clinic”, CBC News (30 November 2017), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/another-woman-gave-
birth-to-my-child-surrogate-sues-fertility-clinic-1.4427248>. 
166  Ibid. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Ibid. 
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obtaining of consent are not always followed.169 Unless an 
incident is reported by the media, the incident passes 
unnoticed. Whether the Chonn incident is an outlier or 
indicative of a larger problem, we do not know, as other 
instances have not garnered publicity. Interestingly, no 
information exists on compliance to the Section 8 
(Consent) Regulations.170 Whether such an incident would 
be recorded under the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and 
Ova Regulations as an adverse event is unclear.171  
 
The amendment at subsection 10(2)(c) requiring 
the screening and testing of the “obtained” ova “donated” 
by a woman and used in her surrogate pregnancy means 
that the traditional surrogate assumes a dual reproductive 
identity: she is both an ova donor and surrogate. The 
shifting status of patient, donor, reproductive gamete and 
embryo recipient, and obtained ova create liminal 
reproductive legal categories. When a traditional surrogate 
is considered to be a “donor”, but not viewed by the clinic 
as a “patient”, there exists the possibility that possible 
mistakes and misunderstandings will take place like the 
one encountered by Ms. Chonn.     
                                                 
169  See UK, Department of Health, Human Fertilization & Embryology 
Authority, “State of the Fertility Sector: 2016–17” (December 2017) at 
17, figure 5. The report reveals that even in a heavily regulated 
jurisdiction, failure to obtain consent is a persistent problem, one that 
has legal, parental, and regulatory consequences.   
170  No inspection reports or notices regarding compliance to the Section 8 
(Consent) Regulations have been cited or published online by Health 
Canada. 
171  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, s 69.1: “An establishment 
and a health professional that have reasonable grounds to believe that 
an adverse reaction has occurred.” The protocol appears to refer to 
safety precautions rather than incorrect use or transfer.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The SCC in Ref re AHRA stated that “. . . criminal law 
power does not give Parliament the unconditional right to 
action to protect morality, safety and public health. . . . It is 
not enough to identify a public purpose . . . the evil must 
be real and the apprehension of harm must be 
reasonable.”172   
 
This paper has argued that when the harm test 
established by the SCC in Ref re AHRA173 is applied to the 
situation of a traditional surrogate using her own 
“obtained” ovum in her surrogate pregnancy, one 
encounters difficulty in isolating specific health and safety 
risks capable of meriting criminal code sanctions being 
applied to persons who would use an unscreened and 
untested obtained ovum donated by a woman and used in 
her own surrogate pregnancy. The paper could not identify 
health and safety risks posed by unscreened and untested 
traditional surrogate’s obtained ovum either to the 
traditional surrogate ova recipient (the person from whom 
the ova were obtained), IVF clinic and staff, or to stored 
human reproductive materials and embryos obtained from 
other patients. A stronger argument can be found in the 
benefits to children born of a traditional surrogacy, 
particularly if screening and testing could be applied to pin 
point the presence or absence of inheritable genetic 
diseases.  
 
                                                 
172  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 13–14. 
173  Ibid at para 243. 
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Yet, as beneficent as genetic testing and the 
collection of surrogate health and medical history 
information may be, the 2012 amendment at subsection 
10(2)(c) will apply to an extremely small subset of 
traditional surrogate-born children. The number of children 
born to traditional surrogates is unknown as no Canadian 
public health agency or birth registry separately identifies 
these births.174 The proportion of traditional surrogate 
children conceived as a result of IVF techniques is also 
unknown though IUI is the more common treatment used 
by this group of surrogates.175 Decision making in the 
absence of population health evidence combined with no 
commensurate requirement to maintain a donor registry 
renders a failure to use unscreened and untested obtained 
ova used by traditional surrogate in her surrogate 
pregnancy an unsubstantiated harm to the surrogate and 
imposes a misplaced and misshapen law regarding the 
protection of children born as a result of this type of 
surrogacy. One is left wondering why failure to collect 
genetic and health information from such a small group of 
surrogates constitutes a pressing health and safety evil 
meriting criminal law sanctions especially when the 
majority of traditional surrogates will not be subject to the 
mandatory testing and screening specified in the 2018 
proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and 
accompanying Directives.  
 
It is important to recall the remit of the AHRA as 
stated by the government when it announced its intentions 
to bring this section of the AHRA into force: “The Act 
                                                 
174  White, “Why We Don’t Know”, supra note 30 at 64. 
175  Millbank, supra note 52. 
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protects individuals in Canada by setting out prohibited 
activities related to assisted human reproduction that may 
pose significant human health and safety risks or that have 
been deemed to be ethically unacceptable or incompatible 
with Canadian values.”176 The practice of commercial 
surrogacy is a prohibited activity as it has been deemed to 
be morally unacceptable and incompatible with Canadian 
values. An unscreened and untested ovum obtained from a 
woman and used in her surrogate pregnancy now falls into 
the category of prohibited activities on the basis of its risk 
to health and safety. Yet, as this paper has argued the extent 
of the health and safety test as laid out by the Supreme 
Court in Ref re AHRA cannot be fully sustained.177 
Moreover as Justices Le Bel and Deschamps opined not all 
public health risks should be addressed through criminal 
law.”178 It is worth considering whether the medical testing 
of surrogates, including those who use their own ova in 
their surrogate pregnancy, more appropriately falls within 
the scope of provincial health responsibilities.  Certainly, 
if the more pressing justification warranting mandatory 
medical and genetic screening and testing is that of concern 
of transmission of genetic disease it follows that the 
government should have taken measures to ensure that all 
surrogates are screened and tested and that a pan-Canadian 
third-party donor registry established.  
 
It is tempting to argue that the imposition of 
mandatory screening and testing of ova obtained from a 
                                                 
176  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations, supra note 9. 
177  Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 243. 
178  Ibid at 243. 
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donor and used in her surrogate pregnancy was a misplaced 
attempt to suppress the “moral evil” of traditional 
surrogacy though in this case through the guise of a “health 
and safety evil”. If this is the case, then subsection 10(2)(c) 
functions as a backdoor means of marginalizing and 
discouraging the practice of traditional surrogacy enabled 
by assisted reproductive methods as the imposition of 
mandatory screening and testing procedures may serve to 
discourage the practice. For example, not all clinics have 
the expertise or ability to follow the procedures required to 
test and screen ova as was the case when the federal semen 
regulations were adopted in 1996.179 The Designated 
Donor option as described in the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard 
and 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations 
will assist to decrease the ova screening and testing burden 
in cases where the traditional surrogate is known to 
intended parents. Even so, not all traditional surrogates will 
qualify as Designated Donors though the requirements of 
the type of qualifying relationship needed have not been 
fully described.180 
  
More troubling, however, is the potential for 
confusion created by the blurring of roles as the traditional 
surrogate is the recipient of her own ova. Precise clinic 
practice guidelines need to be in place so that traditional 
surrogates retain the ability to exercise control over 
“obtained” ova. Application of the AHRA Section 8 
(Consent) Regulations needs to be significantly robust to 
ensure that the act of “obtaining” the patient’s ova will not 
                                                 
179  Daria O’Reilly et al, “Feasibility of an Altruistic Sperm Donation 
Program in Canada: Results from a Population-Based Model” (2017) 
14:8 Reprod Health 1 at 1.  
180  2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note at 69, s 32. 
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interfere with the ability of the “donor” to determine its 
reproductive use, be this in her own pregnancy, a surrogate 
pregnancy, or by a third-party. The surrogate’s ova can also 
be donated for research or training.  
 
Another source of confusion originates from the 
failure to regard surrogates as “fertility patients”. The 
traditional surrogate who will be the recipient of an embryo 
comprised of her ovum and sperm donated by the intended 
father or some other third-party has not be been regarded 
as a “fertility patient” as this term is reserved by fertility 
clinics for the intended parents as it is this party who 
experiences infertility.181 As the Chonn incident reveals the 
liminal legal status the traditional surrogate assumes by 
agreeing to undergo ovarian stimulation to obtain ova blurs 
the lines of fertility patient, third-party donor, and 
reproductive ova user. This mutable status has the potential 
to create confusion for the clinic tasked with delivering 
fertility treatments and to foster misunderstanding among 
all of the parties involved.  
  
The amended 2012 AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c) 
seeks to discourage and criminalize the use of unscreened 
and tested ova obtained from a traditional surrogate and 
used in her own surrogate pregnancy.  This measure 
harkens back to the Baird Commission’s 1993 report, 
which stated that “surrogacy of any sort is exploitative and 
unacceptable.”182  The Baird Commission which 
recommended the prohibition of surrogacy sought “to 
prevent psychological harm to the surrogate who may bond 
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with her unborn child and to save women from the ‘evil’ of 
surrogacy.”183  A subsequent Parliamentary Committee 
report, Building Families, written as part of a review 
undertaken of the proposed 2004 Assisted Human 
Reproduction legislation expressed the view that “non-
commercial (altruistic) surrogacy arrangements can also be 
socially harmful for the resulting child and place the health 
of women at risk.”184 Even though the Commissioners 
agreed with the proposed prohibition of surrogacy for 
commercial gain, they stated nonetheless that “surrogacy 
for non-commercial reasons should be discouraged but not 
criminalized.”185   
 
This paper has advanced the argument that the 
rationale for mandating criminal code powers requiring 
screening and testing of a traditional surrogate’s ova is 
based on a tenuous health and safety rationale. The 
potential for transmission of genetic disease is a stronger 
justification though the AHRA at subsection 10(2) c) does 
not require screening and testing for all traditional 
surrogates with the result that its application to a small set 
of cases suggests a disproportionate use of criminal code 
powers. The real “evil” in this arrangement is not one of 
health and safety but that of the use of criminal law powers 
to constrain the practice of traditional surrogacy, a legally 
permissible activity when conducted in a non-commercial 
manner.186 An analogy to this situation can be found in a 
recent American anti-abortion legislation, Texas HB2, 
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which was proposed as a patient health and safety 
protection measure, but which would have seriously 
transformed the ability of women to access abortion 
services had it been approved.187 
 
Canada’s assisted human reproduction legislation 
is deeply flawed. Piecemeal amendments and regulatory 
tinkering serve to further confuse Canada’s fertility law. 
The federal government’s application of a health and safety 
justification to support criminal code penalties for failure 
to screen and test ovum obtained from a woman and used 
in her own surrogate pregnancy is tenuous. More 
dangerous, however, are the underlying implications for 
consent and reproductive autonomy of a traditional 
surrogate undergoing IVF treatments and the dangerous 
legal liminal spaces it creates. The on-going lack of a pan-
Canadian donor registry weakens further the health and 
safety justification for a legally mandated medical and 
genetic history data collection from this subset of 
traditional surrogates. Failure to tackle these matters is the 
true “evil” that needs to be addressed.  
                                                 
187  Whole Woman's Health et al v Hellerstedt, Commissioner, Texas, 
Department of State Health Services et al, 579 US (2016), No 15-274, 
argued 2 March 2016, decided 27 June 2016.   
